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Abstract 
Turkey, during recent years, aims at re-conceptualizing its geostrategic and  
international position through the lenses of a new foreign policy. A pro-active and  
multi-dimensional role in regional and international affairs has been set on the  
international political framework. However, such a tendency was first met during  
Özal’s era. After  Özal until early 2000’s the Turkish government focused more on  
domestic politics and national interests, rather than the international role of the  
country. Nevertheless, the emergence in power of an Islamic party, AKP, set a new  
axis of priorities concerning Turkish Foreign Policy,  influenced by Ahmet  
Davutoğlu, firstly as advisor of Prime Minister in foreign affairs and then as Minister  
of Foreign Affairs.  The press either refers to “Neo-ottomanism”, a “New Middle  
East policy” or “A New Era” in Turkish Foreign Policy. This dissertation aims to give  
a definition of the term “Neo-ottomanism” and its influence on Turkish Foreign  
policy .  
The dissertation has five chapters. The First Chapter, is the introduction to the  
subject. The Second Chapter offers a definition of the term “Neo-ottomanism”. The  
Third Chapter outlines the main changes in Turkish Foreign policy toward its multiple  
regional interests (Balkans, Greece, Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus, Russia,  
USA, EU). The Fourth Chapter examines the challenges of this policy regionally  
and internationally. The Concluding Chapter gives a summary of the  
aforementioned issues and proposes future tendencies for Turkish foreign policy.  
As far as research sources concerned, political analysis, speeches, journals, newspaper  
articles, studies and related books would be taken under consideration.  
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Introduction 
This dissertation examines the emergence of “Neo-ottomanism” in Turkey’s  
politics and its influence in Turkish foreign policy  practices. The time frame for the  
present dissertation is the time of formation of  Neo-ottomanism , at around 1987 to  
the present.  
         Turkey has in recent decades acquired a growing importance in terms of  
international politics. This is more or less due to its geo-political and geo-strategic  
position , a land between Europe, Asia and Africa, including most troublesome  
regions. Moreover, Turkey’s proximity and contacts with major energy suppliers  
explain also its geo-strategic importance and the necessity to follow a clear strategic  
plan towards foreign policy.   
The end of the Cold War was also the end of bipolar political structure and  
stability.  The change of balance in their bilateral relations in the region as well as in  
its relations with Western or Western-oriented organizations has added greatly to a  
new foreign policy process. Turkey was struggling in order to find its position in the  
new emerging world. Turkey, having understood the validity of its geography, at the  
center of the destabilized region, between Balkans in the West and Caucasus and  
Middle East in the East and South, decided to take advantage of the international  
political environment and emerge as a major regional actor, owing to its long  
existence and history within the region.  
        It could be claimed that since the end of the Cold War or even since Özal, a re- 
orientation of Turkish foreign policy has emerged, informally called “Neo-  
ottomanism”. Turgut Özal proposed and even implemented to some extent a new  
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national role conception for Turkey. His vision was to provide his country as a  
regional leader and a bridge connecting East with the West. Özal even opened  
dialogue with countries or regions, which were so far out of the country’s interests.  
However, succeeding governments restored one dimension approach of  
Turkish foreign policy and intraregional relations weakened, while Erbakan’s policy  
emphasized only the Islamic identity of the Turks. So, his openness was towards  
Islamic-oriented countries and not a multi-dimensional one. AKP’s leadership and  
especially the ascendance of Ahmet Davutoğlu in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
“revived” a pro-active and  multi –dimensional policy approach.   
The aim of the present dissertation is to define the term “Neo-ottomanism” in  
the Özalist and Davutoğlu’s framework , outline similarities and differences between  
them and analyze its impact on the Turkish , Greek and international press and  
analysts and on the character of Turkish foreign policy.  
The dissertation is built upon two sources of data. The first is the review of  
published data in research literature related to the topic. The second is primary  
sources, consisted mainly by newspaper articles, interviews, political speeches, so that  
the pulse of time under consideration is given. A literature review was conducted first  
to search, analyze and build the theoretical framework of Neo-ottomanism. Firstly,  
most important references of the present dissertation are Turgut Özal’s Turkey in  
Europe. Europe in Turkey, which analyzes the whole political thought of this  
important politician and initiator of Neo-ottomanism and Ahmet Davutoğlu’s  
“Strategic Depth”, which is considered by the majority as the theoretical framework  
of today’s foreign policy.  Secondly, a study with the title: “Turkish Foreign Policy:  
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New concepts and reflections”, which helped me, define my dissertation topic.  
Thirdly, Turkish press both pro-governmental and oppositional, American and  
Greek press, all presented clearly the interpretation the term had in different socio- 
political frameworks and also its impact on the public. In addition to that, the  
criticism, which was most of the times exaggerated, was evaluated as a part of  Neo- 
ottomanism’s discourse. Also, Alexander Murinson’s article in the Middle Eastern  
Studies Journal with the title “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign  
Policy” was a key reference for the present dissertation, as it analyzes in a  
dispassionate way, not following a certain think tank or political ideology, the origins  
of Neo-ottomanism, the definition of Neo-ottomanism, the extent at which Neo- 
ottomanism is compatible with the “Strategic Depth” theory and policy today.   
In order to analyze the modifications of Turkish foreign policy regarding its  
interaction with certain countries or regions: the Balkans, Greece, the Middle East, the  
Caucasus and Central Asia countries, Russia, US, EU, in a Neo-ottomanist  
framework, selected books like The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy edited by  
Lenore Martin and Dimitris Keridis, following the beginning of Turkey’s negotiations  
with the EU, the Turkish Foreign Policy in the post Cold War Era, following the 9/11  
facts, edited by Idris Bal and Turkey's New World. Changing Dynamics in Turkish  
Foreign Policy edited by Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, at the turn of the new  
millenium, should be referred.   
There is a consensus that the man who ignores its past, cannot live his present  
and builds his future not in a proper way. Turkey for a long time misinterpreted its  
past. A change of dynamics and an identity crisis both of the society and the  
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democracy caused a re-conceptualization of the past. In this respect, Neo-ottomanism,  
emerges as a theory, which supports the reconciliation with the Ottoman past, the  
revival of its successful multiethnic co-existence, of administration effectiveness and  
cultural influence. This re-conceptualization of Turkish foreign policy, which dates  
back to Özal’s era, has given a sense of confidence and the theoretical background for  
initiating an assertive foreign policy, which provided many opportunities for the  
country to act as an important regional factor and evoked many challenges for the  
effectiveness of this vision and the stability of the region. However, politico-economic  
conditions of the country prevented the realization of such a vision. The emergence  
and prevalence of political Islam in Turkey’s political life during the last decade has,  
unlike inauspicious predictions, not led the country to radicalism. In fact, the  
constitutional and institutional reforms, which characterize the country’s political  
agenda, aim at creating an environment which accepts multi-ethnic and multi-cultural  
diversity. Bearing in mind that a state’s foreign policy is greatly influenced by a  
state’s  collective historical memory, Davutoğlu embarks on a re-conceptualization of  
Ottoman past in terms of collective memory.  
However, in the international environment , the term has been misinterpreted  
as irredentist and met harsh criticism. It was considered either as a differentiation of  
Turkey for Europe’s principles and interests and a turn to the Eastern world value  
system or as a reaction to the  non-membership status of Turkey concerning the EU  
and a way to prove its power, its capabilities, its role as a strategic partner for the  
West. However, Neo-ottomanist policy is more than that.  
This dissertation aimed at examining the “old-new” approach of Turkish  
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Foreign Policy, “Neo-ottomanism”, through the following questions: 
• Which are the changes of regional and international system in the last two 
decades ? 
• How and in what extent have these changes transformed the foreign policy of 
Turkey into a new one? 
• How can we define the term “Neo-ottomanism”? 
• How much did “Neo-ottomanism” affected Turkish foreign policy? 
• How is the “Neo-ottomanist” policy being implemented in daily foreign policy 
issues? 
• Which are the challenges for this new foreign policy approach? 
The dissertation has five chapters. The First Chapter, is the introduction to the  
Subject, also a brief historical framework, the literature overview and methodology  
of the dissertation is given. The Second Chapter offers a definition of the term “Neo- 
Ottomanism”, how and when it emerged, its nature and its role in Turkish Foreign  
Policy. The Third Chapter outlines the main changes in Turkish Foreign policy  
during the last  decades in regional and international politics . The Fourth  
Chapter examines the challenges of this policy regionally and internationally.  
The Concluding Chapter gives a summary of the aforementioned issues and proposes  
future tendencies for Turkish foreign policy.  
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Definition of “Neo-ottomanism” 
 
“Neo-ottomanism” is a term, which emerged in the last quarter of the 20th  
century and has raised great criticism and discussion. Although there is no reference  
to the termat  political level, its use by the press is abundant. According to Kemal  
Karpat  (Karpat K., 2002, p. 524), Neo-ottomanism is a neoterism by the Greeks given  
to Turkey after the invasion in Cyprus in 1974. Therefore, the term has negative  
connotations.  It was adopted by the international press during the Bosnian war in  
early 1990’s to characterize Turkey’s sympathy and support provision for all Muslim  
populations in the region, which was considered to be extravagant. Turgut Özal is  
considered by the majority of analysts and scholars as the initiator of Neo-ottomanism  
in Turkey, while Ahmet Davutoğlu, today’s Foreign Minister is considered to have  
led Neo-ottomanism to its maturity. The use of the term parallel to the policy  
gradually faded out in mid-1990’s, as Turkey entered an introversive phase in politics  
as a result of political and economic instability. Any reference of the term, mainly in  
1998, when a rise of political Islam was observed, echoed Özal’s political framework.   
Neo-ottomanism recently has been used to a great extent and criticized both by the  
Turkish and the International press, characterizing Davutoğlu’s foreign policy as such.  
However, Davutoğlu himself denies that his policy is Neo-ottomanist (Çamlıbel C.,  
28.8.2011).While, it has caused serious concern to its neighboring countries. In that  
sense, it is essential that a definition of Neo-ottomanism is given through the Turkish,  
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the Greek and the International view.    
 
 
a) The Greek view 
The term “Neo-ottomanism” and its implementation in Turkish foreign policy  
has caused great concern to the Greek side. The majority of political analysts outlines  
three basic characteristics of this theory :  Ottoman heritage, Islamic rhetoric and a  
political conciliation between Kemalism and political Islam. The over-activity of  
Turkish foreign policy and its goal for political, cultural and economic expansion of  
their influence in multiple regions  is obviously connected, mainly in conservative  
intellectual circles,  with Turkish possible hegemonic or territorial aspirations,  
consisting thus an urgent threat for the Greek sovereignty. In this respect, Davutoğlu’s  
claims for a “restoration of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans”, edited in Wikileaks  
has raised caution of the Greek side (Ήφαιστος Π., Wikileaks vs Νταβούτογλου,  
2010).What is most important is that scholars and analysts, not belonging to the  
conservative political space, also show their concerns over Turkey’s assertive foreign  
policy either they characterize it as “Neo-ottomanism” or not.  
According to Lieutenant Kanavakis (Καναβάκης Ε.) , Νeo-ottomanism  
emerged in 1974 as a re-conceptualization of Kemalist foreign policy to a pro-active  
one, while he associates the Cyprus issue and the Aegean dispute with neo-ottomanist  
policy. He acknowledges Özal as the politician who initiated this policy, however, he  
believes that Νeo-ottomanism  turned to its more dynamic phase during Erdoğan’s  
governorship. Unlike others, he considers that the military factor is still one of major  
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importance for the development of Νeo-ottomanist theory and practice. 
On the other hand, scholar Grigoriadis1 (Grigoriadis I., 2010, p. 4) does not consider  
the term “Neo-ottomanism” as valid, as he holds that it was a term used by the Özalist  
regime, just to shape the extraordinary political initiatives taken by Turgut Özal. He  
points out that Turkish economic bloom has been interpreted as enhanced regional  
power and also that Turkey promotes its interests through this. He acknowledges a  
diminished political role for the military, while his skepticism over Turkey’s  
emergence as a regional or even global actor is obvious (Γρηγοριάδης Ι., 2011) . His  
view is that such an experiment is quite a risky case.  According to the journalist  
Athanasopoulos in “Βήµα” newspaper (Αθανασόπουλος Α., 2011, Ο δάσκαλος του  
Ερντογάν στην εξωτερική πολιτική, 2008, Ο "τούρκος Κίσινγκερ" αναλαµβάνει  
δράση, 2009) , Νeo-ottomanism is no virtual reality, it consists the contemporary  
Turkish foreign policy, which provides a pro-active role for Turkey and attempts to  
combine Middle East and European policy. What the Greek side should take into  
account according to him is the growing influence of Turkey in the Balkans and  
especially among Muslim minorities.  Greece, having a Muslim minority, is,  
consequently, under threat of its territorial integrity. In addition to that, he sees an  
attempt to Greece’s diplomatic isolation through Turkey’s enhanced relations with  
traditional “friends” of the Greeks in the Balkans, like Serbia, and countries connected  
with Greece with frozen conflicts, like Albania.   
1. Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political 
Science, Bilkent University and a Research Fellow at ELIAMEP 
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While for Ifestos (Ήφαιστος Π., Ένας άλλος κόσµος, ο ισλαµικός..., 2011),  
Davutoğlu’s doctrine is a matter of clash of civilizations, reminding us of  
Huntington’s theory2 . 
What is striking is that “Strategic Depth”, Davutoğlu’s book, which  
defines Turkish foreign policy today, edited in 2001, not translated even to a single  
language until late 2008, has been translated in the Greek language as soon as he was  
appointed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and  in less than two years  has been  
criticized through the press, other books and lectures extensively. In that point, we  
should refer to three at least Greek books criticizing “Strategic Depth”, Davutoğlu’s  
and Turkish foreign policy in general.  
The first one, “Neo-ottomanism and Greek identity” adopts a suspicious, more  
or less, attitude towards Turkey’s New Activism, summarizing the major concerns for  
the future of the Greek nation and the Balkans. Stefanos Konstantinides  
(Κωνσταντινίδης Σ., 2009, σσ. 25,28,32,39) maintains that neo-ottomanist discourse  
and Νeo-ottomanism as a Turkish foreign policy gradually emerged after the adoption  
of multi-party political system and the emergence of political Islam. According to him  
Özal shaped Νeo-ottomanist theory and supported conciliation between Kemalism  
and political Islam. While Erbakan paved the way for the emergence of AKP.  
 
2. According to S. Huntington  “The intracivilizational clash of political ideas spawned 
by the West is being supplanted by an intercivilizational clash of culture and 
religion”, (Huntington S., 1997, p. 54) 
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In particular, he states that : 
“Turkish foreign policy has shown recently remarkable mobility. This mobility is  
more obvious since the Islamic party of Justice and Development Party-AKP and  
Erdoğan’s  rise on power in Ankara. It seems that the Islamists continue from the  
point that Turgut Özal stopped. The main characteristic of this policy is its Neo- 
ottomanist orientation , which aims at a more intense and autonomous peripheral  
existence, without shifting of Turkey  from the West….The fact that the power in  
Ankara is implemented in a framework of historical compromise between Islamists  
and Kemalists, gives to the Turkish foreign policy an important flexibility…” 
(Κωνσταντινίδης Σ., 2009, pp. 21-22). 
He continues that : 
“The government of Democratic Party , leaded by Adnan Menderes alloows  in this period the  
political Islam to re-emerge in Turkish society…Thus, it seems that one could set the birth of  
Neo-ottomanism generally and the birth of neo-ottomanist imperial model of turkish foreign  
policy in this period. Its birth is also related to the Brittish support given during this period in  
Turkey to challenge again its rights in Cuprus , which it gave up in the Lausanne Treaty in  
1923…The neo-ottomanist model, as far as Turkish foreign policy concerns, was not  
contradicting actually with Kemalism, since Kemalist Turkey was characterized of having  
expansionist aspirations in the 1930’s..Necmettin Erbakan could be considered as the  
“father” of Turkish political Islam…Erdoğan’s AKP success ows greatly to the perception  
of such idea by Erbakan: The idea of constructing a  regime pole, based on Islam, able to  
challenge Kemalism....” (Κωνσταντινίδης Σ., 2009, pp. 25-27).  
He is of the view that Turkey provides the moral duty of the protection of Turkish and  
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Muslim minorities in the Balkans in order to justify their growing influence in the  
region and also the geopolitical position of the country as a diplomatic weapon to  
promote its European aspirations. His argument is Turkey’s over-activity against  
Greece’s inactivity: 
“Turkey takes advantage of the problems Greece faces in the region, as in the case of the  
Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, in order to develop preferential relations with  
them. In general, Turkey returns to the Balkans using its Islamic and ottoman counter, as this  
are part of the neo-ottomanist model of Turkish foreign policy. A third counter is geopolitics,  
through which the Balkans are associated also with the European aspirations of Turkey…The  
character of Turkish foreign policy is Neo-ottomanist in islamo-ottoman tradition’s  
respect…In Greek-Turkish issues and the Cyprus issue, Turkish foreign policy is hard and  
expansionist…The Greek reactions to Ankara’s expansionist policy are still  
lukewarm.Essentially, Greece’s support to Turkey’s European accession, and not only that, is  
provided without an advantage” (Κωνσταντινίδης Σ., 2009, pp. 39-40).  
Theodoros Batrakoulis (Μπατρακούλης Θ., 2009, σσ. 70,73,84) claims that  
the collapse of the Soviet Union activated nostalgia for the Ottoman past and  
consequently a framework of re-establishment of Ottoman Empire and Islam in the  
Balkans. The axes of Turkish foreign policy formulated by “Strategic Depth”,  
geographic and historic depth of Turkey, aim, according to him, at Greece’s  
isolation from the Cyprus to the Balkans and full Greek allegiance to Turkey’s  
demands (!). In his exact words : 
“In 1989, there was a re-emergence of ethno-religious minorities in Europe, as for  
almost half a century their problems had been undermined in the bipolar international  
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system…As far as the Balkan Peninsula concerned, from the early years followed the  
fall of socialistic regimes, Ankara created a framework of reconnection with the  
Ottoman past, the Turkish population and the Islamic communities of the region. It  
could be considered as a geopolitical phenomenon of   dedicated atavism…Focusing on  
Turkish foreign policy, it could be considered as an issue of re-Islamism and re- 
Ottomanism…There is a consensus that, in the last three decades, Turkey turns towards a re- 
Islamism, which continues Ottoman tradition. Furthermore, it could play a role  
complementary to that of the Western countries in the Balkans, mainly because of their  
remarkable Muslim populations. From the early 1990’s, Turkey has made systematic effort to  
construct a favorable to her “Muslim arc” , which starts from the Turkish and Muslim  
minority of Bulgaria and Greek Thrace and passing by FYROM and Kosovo, ends to  
Albania…    ” (Μπατρακούλης Θ., 2009, pp. 70-73).  
For today’s Neo-ottomanism he remarked that : 
“Nevertheless, Turkey has, as we have seen, a neo-ottoman geostrategic plan. Ankara aims at  
Greece’s isolation from Cyprus to the Balkans and full Greek allegiance to Turkey…Thrace is  
a goal of revisionist/expansionist policy of the Turkish regime, in which there is a peculiar co- 
existence of Islamo-democrats-Kemalist-Military…Ankara aims with its propaganda to  
persuade the international actors that , in the Greek Thrace, lives a solid Turkish community,  
which is under pressure from the Greek state, and evoke a territorial issue...” 
(Μπατρακούλης Θ., 2009, pp. 84-85).  
The second one, “Strategic Depth, Living Space and Genocides”, adopts an  
extreme attitude towards the writer of “Strategic Depth”, Ahmet Davutoğlu and his  
aspirations. The author (Μεγαλοκονόµος Μ., 2010, σσ. 17,21-25) even compares  
“Strategic Depth” with “Mein Kampf” (!), clearly comparing thus Davutoğlu with  
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Hitler:  
“Nevertheless, the manifested recognition of the work of Ahmet Davutoğlu and his  
obvious revisionism reminds automatically the elder of other admiration and  
recognition from the West manifestations towards the greatest revisionist of middle 
war period…” (Μπατρακούλης Θ., 2009, p. 15) .   
He believes that the contemporary socio-political conditions are similar with  
that before the outbreak of the second World War:  
“The circumstances are suitable for clashes, when there are great reversals, like  
the one, which took place twenty years ago, from bipolarity to one pole system and then to  
multi-polarity. These changes (as both “Strategic Depth” and “Mein Kampf” refer) do not  
last forever. So, any advantage by these circumstances should be taken quickly and in  
time…The present circumstances of enormous globalization are, in this respect, unique in  
history of global economy…The Third Reich considered similarly as a “chance”, the time,  
when before the war, their main rival, France had also the same problems...” 
(Μπατρακούλης Θ., 2009, pp. 20-22).  
Also his references to  Lebensraum (Μεγαλοκονόµος Μ., 2010, σ. 32), to the  
variability of borders, to the challenges for Greece and the Balkans all resemble,  
according to the author,  with that of Hitler’s policy:  
“Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” underlined always a number of secondary malformations, as far as  
the definition of the European territory concerned in order to continue displeasure, through  
which the National-socialistic Movement survived before the Second World War. In the  
example of Greek-Turkish relations ,it is characteristic how the sense of being underclass is  
expressed by Ahmet Davutoğlu for the fact that the Aegean islands were given to Greece after  
the Second World War… Davutoğlu, referring to the borders of the Middle East, added that:  
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“none should consider that the borders are permanent, because someone draws the  
borders…”. The same wrote Hitler in “Mein Kampf”, almost identical: “The borders of the  
states are defined by humans and change by humans…” (Μπατρακούλης Θ., 2009, pp. 24-
25,32).   
He also believes that the enhanced regional and global role that  Davutoğlu demands  
for his country is overweening and hazardous (Μεγαλοκονόµος Μ., 2010, σ. 50): 
 In addition to that, he is suspicious of the intentions and consequences of Turkey’s  
duty for the protection of all Turkish and Muslim minorities, in several regions: 
“The “protection” internationally of the minorities who interest Turkey, with a change that  
refers to the Islamic population, reminds us intensively of Hitler’s:”The Movement (National- 
socialistic) should be aware that as guards of the highest form of human nature in this world,  
we also have the highest duties; and it could succeed it better as long as it is conscious that it  
helps the German people to understand their race” (Μπατρακούλης Θ., 2009, pp. 76-77).  
 He claims that Greece and other ex-Ottoman states are under threat of extinction or  
assimilation by the growing neo-ottoman influence (Μεγαλοκονόµος Μ., 2010, σσ.  
31,77-78).  
While Stavros Lygeros in “Islamist Terrorism, USA and Neo-ottomanism”  
adopts a detached  -in a sense-  approach of Neo-ottomanism, except for the  
characterizing of Turkish foreign policy as “having imperial grandeur” (Λυγερός Σ.,  
2010, σ. 200), he examines mainly the soundness of his arguments and concludes  
that  neo-ottomanist theory is based on a idealization of Ottoman era (Λυγερός Σ.,  
2010, σ. 201). In his exact words: 
“As theorist of Neo-ottomanism he visualizes and as Foreign Minister he tries to  
construct a peripheral system, whose center and in the role of hegemony would be his  
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country. He idealizes Ottoman Empire and presents it as a decisive and regulatory  
factor of historical development in the wider region, in order to promote his strategy. He even  
searches for ancestry also in the ancient civilizations of the region, in order to support his  
argument. Arbitrarily, he states that the Ottoman Empire compounded in the course of time  
these civilizations…The Turkish Foreign Minister uses as a vehicle the co-existence in the 
context of the Ottoman Empire, which resents in an ideal way as a common history…” 
(Λυγερός Σ., 2010, pp. 201-202).  
He also observes that reflective diplomacy is not enough to resolve conflicts with  
Greece and Cyprus (Λυγερός Σ., 2010, σ. 207): 
“The only serious exceptions in the diplomatic scene, which Ahmet Davutoğlu has set up with 
 the title “zero problems with the neighbors” are their relations with Greece and Cyprus. This  
is not random. Greek-Turkish issues and the Cyprus issue are live problems with real stakes  
and not superstitions or conflicts for the past…Therefore, while in all other diplomatic fronts  
the Turkish diplomacy has shown great flexibility, in both fronts concerning Hellenism it  
appears flexible in the rhetoric level, but inflexible in essence”. (Λυγερός Σ., 2010, p. 207)  
On the whole, the Greek approach of emerging Neo-ottomanism is on the one  
hand xenophobic, suspicious, nationalistic and passionate, on the other hand a  
dispassionate approach examines the validity of Davutoğlu’s arguments in forming  
such theory, raises some issues of intellectual inconsistency and expresses skepticism  
on goals and practices of their own country’s  foreign policy.  
 
b) Turkish view 
 
Although Ahmet Davutoğlu does not accept the title of “reviver” of Neo- 
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ottomanism in Turkey, it is widely accepted that he initiated a new era in Turkish  
foreign policy, whether one accepts the term Neo-ottomanism or not.  Cengiz Çandar  
explains that “Neo-ottomanism” can easily be considered by Turkey’s neighboring  
countries and regions as “expansionism”. Therefore, Ahmet Davutoğlu disapproves  
such a characterization (Çandar C., 2009, p. 5).   
It is remarkable that there is variability among Turkish press columnists,  
analysts and professors regarding the definition of Neo-ottomanism in today’s Turkish  
policy. On the one hand, there is one group which is in favor of the new foreign policy  
line, on the other hand there is another which expresses its skepticism and  
differentiation towards new Turkish foreign policy. What is surprising though is some  
analyses which compare  Davutoğlu’s with Atatürks foreign policy.  
 Bülent Aras observes that there is continuity between Özal’s “Neo- 
ottomanism” and Davutoğlu’s foreign policy initiatives. However, he is not  
characterizing Turkish contemporary foreign policy as purely neo-ottomanist. He  
considers that the Ottoman heritage discourse paves the way for a more effective  
communication and co-operation between Turkey and neighboring countries and  
regions. He also emphasizes that  
“Turkey’s foreign policy in neighboring regions does not assume a hegemonic role for  
Turkey but targets an inclusive approach for building peace and security based on the  
dynamics within these regions” (Aras B., Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy,  
2009, p. 7).  
Thus,  defending formal foreign policy objectives against multiple critics.  He is also  
of the view that Turkey should pay attention both to Muslim and non-Muslim  
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neighbors, if it is to become a global actor (Aras B., What is the "strategic depth"  
doctrine?, 2010, p. 13).   
According to Kiniklioğlu (Kiniklioğlu S., 2007), Neo-ottomanism, which is  
mainly a reconciliation with the Ottoman past, emerged as a response to globalization  
challenges. In that sense, Turkey through its effort to deal with identity challenges,  
rediscovered its Ottoman past.  
For Taspinar, Neo-ottomanism constitutes today the rehabilitation of the  
Ottoman past in the sense of tolerance to multi-culturalism , not a strategic plan for  
territorial   rehabilitation of the  Ottoman Empire (Taspinar Ö., Dancing with the  
Kurds, 2008). Taspinar recognizes a connection between Özal’s Neo-ottomanism and  
the newly emerged Neo-ottomanism, which is defined as a  re-conceptualization of  
Turkish identity taking account of its Ottoman heritage and a pro-active foreign  
policy (Taspinar Ö., Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalist foreign policy, 2008). Taspinar is  
also of the view that Turkey aims at ensuring its sphere of influence in  former  
Ottoman regions, where national and economic interests meet, at political, economic,  
diplomatic and cultural level. Furthermore, Neo-ottomanism, according to him,  
considers Turkey as a central rather than peripheral country as its location is at  
the center of the wider region of international interest (Taspinar Ö., Turkey's Middle  
East Policies : Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism, 2008, pp. 14-15).   
In her article “Looking to the East”, Asli Aydintasbas understands the term  
“Neo-Ottomanism” as a new axis in Turkish foreign politics set by the government  
towards the East,  without undermining its Western ties. In her phrase “The sleeping  
giant –a member of NATO and a candidate for EU membership- now seems eager for  
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a new role” includes all AKP’s aspirations for enjoying a role as a regional power and  
a global actor. It gives a sense of grandeur, which is compatible with Neo- 
ottomanism. However, she remarks that there should be a balance between secularism  
and Islam solidarity (Aydintasbas A., 2009).  
While, for Keyman, the adoption of a new foreign policy in Turkey is just one  
aspect of a series of transformations and changes in order to meet the EU and  
international politics’ demands (Keyman F., 2010, p. 17). 
Professor Ali Arslan, however, does not acknowledge contemporary Turkish  
foreign policy as “Neo-ottomanist”. He considers it as “a return to the foreign policy  
followed during the time of the country’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk”.  He also  
supports that EU’s negative stance towards Turkey’s membership has re-activated  
Turkey’s pro-active foreign policy.  He concludes that “Turkey relies on tactical  
Ottomanism” rather than Neo-ottomanism and that any reference to previous multi- 
ethnic co-existence should not be regarded as Neo-ottomanism (Yavuz E., 2009).   
Similarly, for Oran, Turkey’s foreign policy is compatible with Kemalist  
Tradition and Neo-ottomanism. He holds that Kemalist foreign policy favored “strong  
Westernism and good neighbourliness” (Oran B., 2010) .  
In addition to that, Zahedi and Bacik in their article “Kemalism Is Dead, Long  
Live Kemalism” also supports that AKP’s policy has proved to be “a defender of  
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk”, as its policies towards civil liberties, minority rights, the  
control of military and the development of a free market, all fulfill Ataturk’s vision  
(Zahedi D. & Bacik G., 2010).  
On the other hand, Mumcu states that the “New Turkish Foreign Policy” is not  
22  
  
quite new. He dates it back to post-cold war era. What he finds as an innovation is  
“the change in Turkey’s relations towards other civilizations”. He also marks a  
discrimination between Muslim and non-Muslim nations (Mumcu Ö., 2010, p. 15) . 
On the contrary , Burak Bekdil, columnist of Hurriyet, claims that Neo- 
ottomanism is rather conservative and xenophobic than progressive. He adds that  
today’s Neo-ottomanism is deprived of its multiculturalism and is focused on religion  
and its practice, while it is characterized from times to times by pragmatism. He also  
states that Davutoğlu’s aspirations for a leading regional role are rather naive. He is  
obviously a representative of the secular side of Turkish society expressing his  
concerns for Turkey’s shifting foreign policy (Bekdil B., Why neo-Ottomanism is bad  
for Turkey, 2009).  
On the other hand, Yusuf Kanli considers Neo-ottomanism as an initiative of  
Turkey’s government to gain cultural and political influence in the neighboring at  
least region, even characterizes it  as a “pax-Ottomana” project. However, he remarks  
that such aspirations would not probably become true as Neo-ottomanism lacks,  
according to him, full support of EU and regional powers (Kanli Y., Turkey, an 
honest broker?, 2009).  
For Soner Cagaptay , Neo-ottomanism is a “misnomer” for Turkish foreign  
policy, which he characterizes as pro-Arab and which is interpreting, as he see it, the  
world in terms of religion and economic interests (Cagaptay S., 2009) .  
As already said, there is a variability of opinions in Turkish society, as itself is  
not homophonous and monolithic. Defenders of traditional secular state fear that  
Turkey not only is keeping gradually distance from the West , but also that Turkish  
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foreign policy deconstructs Turkey’s secular character and changes it to an Islamist  
one, which could easily turn to radical Islamism. In that sense, contemporary Turkish  
foreign policy, so-called “Neo-ottomanism” is considered as a threat for democracy  
and society.  On the other side, supporters of new Turkish foreign policy are  
overenthusiastic, as they consider all the opportunities given for their country  in the  
cultural, political and mainly economic sector, as a result of the enhanced role of  
Turkey in the region. However, there are also skepticisms among them about the  
duration and the effectiveness of such an “experiment”,  that Turkey should confirm  
its role in the region and the neighboring regions in order to benefit from these  
relations. There are also a few people who claim that today’s foreign policy is  
fulfilling the vision of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. This could be explained in the sense  
that Ataturk’s as well as Davutoğlu’s vision is to create a strong, respectful Turkey   
that would become a model country for the region. Otherwise, Davutoğlu’s openness  
is obviously different form Ataturk’s objectives for domestic security and stability.  
 
c) International view 
 
The re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy, widely known as Neo- 
ottomanism,  “has generated a wary response on the part of Ankara’s traditional  
Western allies” (Torbakov I. & Ojanen H., Is Turkey emerging as an independent  
regional power?, 2009, p. 3). Most of the times Neo-ottomanism has been interpreted  
as a turn from Western orientation to a fully Eastern orientation of Turkish foreign  
policy. Furthermore, Turkey’s aspirations for an enhanced regional and global role  
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has caused serious concern as the “West” understands it as a threat for contemporary  
balance of power. However, there is also the other side, which regards Davutoğlu’s  
policy as pure pragmatism or a reaction to EU’s skepticism  to full membership of  
Turkey. 
Torbakov and Ojanen (Torbakov I. & Ojanen H., Is Turkey emerging as an  
independent regional power?, 2009, p. 4) state that such a policy is “rather  
complementary than contradictory” to Western orientation of Turkey. Turkey has not  
changed and should not , according to them, change its EU-orientation.  They also  
characterize this policy as “Middle Easternization” rather than “Neo-ottomanism”,  
which is considered as a “vainglorious neo-imperial ideology” mistakenly attributed  
to Turkey’s openness to the East.  
 According to Murinson , Neo-ottomanism was given birth by Turgut Özal,  
while under Davutoğlu’s doctrine, reached its maturity. Davutoğlu’s doctrine is  
considered to be a combination of Özal’s Neo-ottomanism as Ottoman legacy is  
considered again as a “soft power” instrument of Turkey’s policy , Erbakan’s “multi- 
dimensional” foreign policy, as contemporary Turkish foreign policy is intended to  
embrace both the East and the West  and Davutoğlu’s geopolitics approach, as  
strategic importance of certain regions is taken under consideration in foreign policy  
decision-making (Murinson A., 2006, p. 947).   
For Dario D’ Urso, Neo-ottomanism is considered as an offensive term,  
usually used by AKP opponents, as it is obviously connected with imperial  
aspirations. However, he acknowledges a shift of axis as far as Turkish foreign policy  
is concerned. He prefers the term “re-orientation” of Turkey’s strategic interests,  
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which are more or less defined by pragmatism, so does Turkish foreign policy (D'  
Urso D., 2010, pp. 16-17).  
 For Meral and Paris, Turkey’s ambitions for a central role in the Middle East 
 and also the enhancement of economic ties with their neighborhood is something far  
from Neo-ottomanism , which is considered as a combination of mild Islamism and  
Turkish nationalism. They observe that pro-active foreign policy was adopted since  
Cem’s era. External pressure , however, led to re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy  
(Meral Z. & Paris J., 2010, p. 78).  
According to Danforth the term “Neo-ottomanism” initiated during Özal’s era,  
was used either in a positive (Cengiz Çandar) or a negative way (Balkan writers),  
suggesting a tolerance at multicultural identities within a region in the former case or  
Turkish imperialism in the latter. Today’s Neo-ottomanism, for Danforth, is focused  
on enhancing its strategic relations with Muslim and non-Muslim neighbors and not  
overemphasizing US and NATO ties. In that sense, he believes that Davutoğlu’s Neo- 
Ottomanism is comparable with Özalist Neo-ottomanism and the non-alignment of  
Atatürk and Inönü (Danforth Ν., 2008, pp. 90-91,94).  
Having all things concerned, we could say that Neo-ottomanism is a valid  
term, but not actually in the sense that Neo-ottomanism firstly emerged under  
Özal. The term “Neo-ottomanism” is a political theory, which characterizes  
Turkey’s closer relations in political, economic, social and cultural level with  
countries or regions once belonged to the Ottoman Empire and Turkey’s aspirations to  
expand its influence to regions with which they have a common Ottoman past .  
 It is a compromise between Kemalism and political Islam, in the sense that it does not  
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deny Turkey’s western orientation and democratization process, however it also  
embraces the East, that is, other Muslim countries in its neighborhood. However, the  
importance of geopolitics and geo-economics in contemporary policy making should  
also be considered as an important aspect of today’s Neo-ottomanism. Turkey is not  
drifting away from the West, but it sets other areas of interest as well. Turkey does not  
have aspirations of reviving the Ottoman Empire in terms of territorial expansion.   
However, it does have aspirations for political and economic influence.  Turkey is not  
losing its identity, but recognizes and accepts all its aspects as  a multicultural and  
multi-ethnic state.  
 In an overview of the sources given, we could say that the term “Neo- 
Ottomanism” has been perceived by different political and national environments  
either as a theory or as pragmatism. As far as the Turkish view concerned, we could  
say that the majority of the journalists referring to it belong to the secular, Kemalist  
political side. The opponents of Neo-ottomanism , associate the term with  
backwardness, a re-Islamism process and opportunism. So, it reminds us of its  
negative connotations, given by the time of its birth.  
On the other hand, the Greek side, mainly the conservative intellectuals and  
Journalists, clearly relate Neo-ottomanism to irredentism and consider it as a direct  
threat for the sovereignty of their country. However, these are not the only part of  
society, who raises criticism on the emergence of this assertive policy. What it is  
remarkable, however, is that other than conservative analysts also stand critical to the  
term and its practice. They show their skepticism on their own country’s limited  
political initiatives towards a stronger representation in regional and global affairs and  
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examine the validity and feasibility of Neo-ottomanism.  
 The international side, however, is quite skeptic of Turkey’s new foreign  
policy either they recognize it as Neo-ottomanism or not. In the first case, while they  
recognize the term, they give it a different meaning, rather a combination of mild  
Islamism and Turkish nationalism. In the second case, today’s Neo-ottomanism is  
considered as pragmatism. However, all agree and insist –as a form of exhortation,  
advice, warn towards Turkey-that Turkey should keep its Western orientation.  
 
 
The modifications of Turkish Foreign Policy 
 
Until early 1980’s, the dominant ideology of Turkey was Kemalism, which  
aimed at  Westernization of Turkey, that is the process of adopting the western  
political system and western customs. This orientation has been proved by the  
membership or candidateship of Turkey for Western organizations, so as to turn the  
Turkish Republic from a declining ex-Empire to an up-to-date democratic western  
state.  The other main principle was keeping the status quo, that is keeping the  
national borders safe and secure from any external factors . Ottoman past was denied  
as a symbol of the  Empire’s disintegration (Taspinar Ö., Between Neo-Ottomanism  
and Kemalism, 2008, pp. 2,5).  
On the contrary, Özal not only initiated a discussion about Ottoman heritage,  
but also claimed its role in forming Turkish  identity (Ataman M., 2002, pp. 122,125).   
As Özal stated,  
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“It is evident that our present cultural synthesis has evolved throughout this history as a  
result of the interaction of the cultural heritage of the land,  as well as our Islamic and  
pre-Islamic cultures” (Özal T., 1991, p. 2),  
suggesting Neo-ottomanism as a way to re-identify Turkish nation. Özal  
through a re-conceptualization of “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” stressed the role of  
Islam and Turkish nationalism for the position of Turks in international politics. He  
even claimed a role for Turkey as the dominant power of Islamic world and signed a  
lot of international agreements with the Islamic world, Eastern European, Eastern  
Asian countries and the United States (Ataman M., 2002, p. 132) . He also supported  
the movement for cultural freedom of the Kurds. His initiative for the establishment  
of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation was another step towards his aim at building  
regional cooperation. However, he was also intended to strengthen relations with the  
West as well, but not as an inferior member-state. His main objectives were  
economic re-structuring and political strengthening within the region. Özal also  
challenged the intervention of the military in political affairs. Although Turkey  
applied for EU membership during Özal’s era, for Özal, the integration of Turkey in  
Europe was not a purpose of its own, but an important step towards economic and  
political development of the country (Danforth Ν., 2008, p. 89)  
 The succeeding governments aimed at restoring the traditional Kemalism,  
retained though aspects of Özal’s policy, that they considered as compatible with the  
official state ideology. Tansu Çiller’s speech on “Turkish foreign policy in its dynamic  
tradition” (Çiller T., 1996) is characteristic of  Çiller’s foreign policy aims and  
principles. She stressed that “respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial  
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integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states”  are key elements  
of Turkish foreign policy. The last one “non-interference” principle is repeated many  
times throughout her speech. While she contradicts the “non-interference” principle  
with its opposite, as she lets us understand, characterizing the latter as “adventurism”.  
On the other hand, she considers Turkish foreign policy as “multifaceted” and is  
proud of Turkey’s membership in many organizations like NATO, OECD, OIC,  
BSEC, the Council of Europe, the Economic Co-operation Organization. However,  
for Çiller, what defines relations with other countries is not just geography and  
history, but also satisfying mutual interests.  
 According to Ismail Cem (Cevik I. & Kanli Y., 1999)  
“Turkey is a multi-regional country…not a “regional power”…that would mean Turkey is a  
power in one region ;a powerful country in the Balkans, for example. Turkey is multinational  
power. It is powerful in the Balkans, the Middle East, North Africa, the Caucasus. Turkey has  
many problems in different geographic areas, but besides this, Turkey has many opportunities  
in the same geographic regions”.  
It is evident that there is continuity in Turkish foreign policy since then as the concept  
of multiple dimensions of Turkish foreign policy, its potential role as a peace  
mediator in several regions and also its interests beyond its traditional borders, are all  
referred in that interview of Foreign Minister , Ismail Cem. What is missing is the  
reference to the Ottoman legacy as a legitimizing basis for Turkey’s assertive policy.   
In the post 9/11 era, Turkey understands its role “across a vast area from the  
Adriatic to Central Asia” and also as a “link between the West and the Islamic world,  
as a modern and secular state with a predominantly Muslim population of Turkish  
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characteristics” , as ambassador Soylemez remarked (Soylemez Y., 2001). The re- 
emergence of the Turkish model  revives Turkey’s regional ambitions and their  
documentation on the basis of former Ottoman ties.   
  It seems that there is a continuity in the process of transforming foreign  
policy-making according to the needs of domestic, regional and global  environment.  
Under AKP rule this process “reached its peak” (Aktaş Yelken G., 2010, p. 41).  
The main vision of contemporary Turkish leadership is that Turkey  
should possess the status it deserves regarding its geopolitical and geostrategic  
importance, as well as its long history in the region.  In this respect, Turkey  
rediscovers its cultural and civilizational affinities with neighboring countries and  
regions and also the limits of engagement with these countries considering the  
opportunities given. In addition to that, the preservation of stability and security  
within the region is of major importance for the Turkish leadership. Turkey also  
envisions itself as not only a regional mediator, but also a promoter of regional  
cooperation and dialogue and a constructor of new regional order. Even more, Turkish  
leadership is intended to transform Turkey from a central country within a certain  
region to a power of  global range  (Aras B. & Gorener A., 2010, pp. 81-85 ˙Aktaş  
Yelken G., 2010, p. 39,52).  
  Davutoğlu states that “Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian,  
Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country all at the same”  
(Davutoğlu Α., 2010, p. 35).In that sense, a review of Turkish foreign policy in a Neo- 
ottomanist context towards the aforementioned regions is what follows.  
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Turkey-Balkans 
 
The end of Cold War was followed by the emergence of new states, new borders,  
 
new economical and political opportunities, new ideas, and new conflicts. In the  
 
 Balkans, Turkey not only because of its past, but also because of its position had such  
 
a potential to become the peace-maker country and stabilizing factor in the region  
 
(Kut Ş., 2000, p. 74). As Alan Cowell reported in New York Times:  
 
“With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the decline of power of its former  
 
Eastern European allies, Turkey has been seen by the United States and other Western  
 
nations as a potential regional anchor” (Cowell A., Turkey Faces Moral Crisis Over  
Bosnia, 1992),  
 
thus reflecting the contemporary common sense.  
 
There is a consensus that the emergence of a new international order encouraged  
 
Neo-Ottomanist rhetoric (Kut Ş., 2000, p. 88).  In the same article, Cowell pointed out  
 
that the long Ottoman rule over the Balkans “has left deep regional suspicions that the  
 
Ottoman’s successors might be scheming to fill the post-cold-war vacuum with  
 
renewed dreams of imperial glory” (Cowell A., Turkey Faces Moral Crisis Over  
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Bosnia, 1992).   However, more than hegemonic aspirations attracted Turkey’s  
 
attention to the region.  Stability and security in the Balkans was important for  
 
Turkey’s security too. The Balkans located between Western Europe and Eurasia,  
 
attracted  Europe, USA and Russia, due also to its energy routes. Therefore, Turkey  
 
aimed at preventing any regional power to “dominate” the region. Turkey’s economic  
 
interests (trade, transportation, tourism) within the region would otherwise be put at  
 
risk. In addition to that, great concern about possible migration waves towards Turkey  
 
and a possible uprising of Kurdish separatists  are all factors justifying Turkey’s  
 
interest for  the region (Türkeş M., 2004, p. 198) (Larrabee S. & Lesser I., Relations  
 
with Greece and the Balkans, 2003, pp. 94, 96).  
 
The exodus of a great number of Turks from Bulgaria in 1989, as they were  
forced to adopt Bulgarian names and they were deprived of  their properties illegally  
(Kamm H., 4.10.1987), caused a new discourse on who is to blame for the repatriation  
of refugees and their violated property rights (Haberman C., 22.6.1989). As  
Davutoğlu observed “ whenever there is a crisis in the Balkans…they look to  
Istanbul” (Davutoğlu A., Unofficial Transcript of Foreign Minister Ahmed  
Davutoğlu's Speech: Principles of Turkish foreign policy, 2009). In general, Turkey’s  
policy for its minorities in the Balkans was to encourage integration of them into the  
countries they were living in, keeping though their cultural, linguistic and religious  
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identity (Türkeş M., 2004, p. 199).  
 Turkey chose to adopt a multinational rather than a unilateral policy towards  
 
the Balkans. Firstly, Turkey acted towards a peaceful solution to the problem of  
 
Yugoslavia, supporting the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. As such a solution was  
 
inevitable, Turkey recognized their independence and developed close relations with  
 
the newly independent –ex-Yugoslavian- states: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia,  
 
Montenegro, Slovenia and FYROM. As scholar Türkeş  stated  : “Turkey had to  
 
play the role of honest mediator to achieve regional stability” (Türkeş M., 2004, p.  
 
204). Therefore, Turkey having recognized the Bosnian war as a great destabilizing  
 
factor for the region, tried to put the issue on the international agenda in order to find  
 
a solution.  
 
However, Turkey’s actions towards this end, particularly Turkey’s interest  
 
on the Bosnian Muslims,  caused great suspicion and criticism, as fears of Turkish  
 
hegemonic aspirations have risen throughout the region. The Greek side, in particular,  
 
understood Turkey’s active policy in the Balkans “as an attempt to establish a   
 
“Muslim arc” on Greece’s northern border”, as Lesser and Larrabee (Larrabee S. &  
 
Lesser I., Relations with Greece and the Balkans, 2003, p. 95) observed.  As journalist  
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Chuck Sudetic remarks :  
 
“Though it is billed as an effort to end the war in Bosnia, the trip is clearly intended to put  
 
Europe on notice that Ankara has a strong interest in Macedonia and other Balkan countries  
 
that emerged from the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913” (Sudetic C.,  
 
1993).  
 
While the Western media interpreted Turkey’s active policy through an Orthodox  
 
(Greece-Serbia-Russia) – Muslim (Turkey, Bulgaria, FYROM, Bosnia-Herzegovina,  
 
Albania) dispute axis   (Türkeş M., 2004, p. 203). In that sense, journalist Engelberg  
 
pointed out :  
 
“Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia all of which have at various times asserted territorial  
 
claims to Macedonia, would seize parts of that country as the violence increased,  
 
according to a possible scenario suggested by C.I.A.. Turkey and perhaps other  
 
Muslim nations might then jump in to support Muslim Albania, such thinking goes,  
 
while Orthodox Greece   would ally itself with the Orthodox Serbs” (Engelberg S.,  
 
25.4.1993) 
 
However, Turkey, as a NATO Member, joined in the organization’s air strike against  
 
the Serbian side by sending aircrafts and troops. During the Bosnian War the Train  
 
and Equip Programme was implemented. At the end of war, Turkey supported the  
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Dayton Agreement (Kut Ş., 2000, p. 83) .  
 
 Turkish relations with the Balkans came to stagnancy after Özal’s death,  
when attention was paid rather to domestic politics than to the Balkans. Major  
economic problems hinder a commercial and political bloom in the region. Turkish  
Balkan policy was also affected by the governmental changes in Albania, Bulgaria,  
and Greece.  In particular, Greece’s change of foreign policy caused great concern to  
its neighboring country, as its influence within the region was increasing at Turkey’s  
expense (Kut Ş., 2000, p. 75).      
Priority given to Europeanization of the Balkans or associations with the  
NATO faded Neo-ottoman ideology during 1990’s. Nevertheless, Turkey welcomed  
and clearly supported EU and  NATO membership of any of the Balkan states (Türkeş  
M., 2004, p. 206) .  “The Balkans should realize that their long term future is in EU  
membership and Europeam integration”, as ambassador Soylemez remarked 
(Soylemez Y., 2001).  
 The change of government in 1997 and the undertaking of Foreign Ministry by  
 
Ismail Cem entered a new period for Turkey’s Balkan policy. He emphasized his  
 
intentions to make the Balkans an area of major priority for Turkey (Kut Ş., 2000, pp.  
 
74-76).  He claimed a more active role for Turkey regarding the Balkan region both  
 
during peaceful and tense periods as a state “with insight into the Balkans, with  
 
Balkan experience” and also as a “Balkan country” (Cevik I. & Kanli Y., 1999) 
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During the outbreak of the Kosovo conflict in 1998, Turkey insisted that the  
rights not only of Albanians but also of Turks and other minorities be respected.  
When the violence increased in Kosovo, Turkey joined an international intervention,  
in accordance with international organizations, the USA and the EU, so as not to  
provoke Balkan countries (Türkeş M., 2004, p. 205). After the NATO intervention,  
Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Cem and later President Demirel went to Kosovo.  
Such a movement was considered as Turkey’s struggle to confirm relations with the  
region.  It was added that Turkey had tried to protect its influence in Kosovo through  
the Turkish minority and to search for new opportunities for Turkish firms in the  
reconstruction of Kosovo.          
 
 Turkey participated in the Foreign Affairs Ministers Conference in 
 
Cologne on 10 June 1999 that convened in order to adopt the Stability Pact. The  
 
Turkish President joined the constituent meeting of the SP in Sarajevo in July 1999.  
Turkey also hosted the Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of South Eastern  
 
European Countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey and  
 
Yugoslavia) in Istanbul in June 1998. Turkish President Demirel is one of the  
 
founders of the Balkan Political Club, “formulated as a result of several meetings in  
 
Sofia in 2001 with the participation of 40 founding members from Albania, Bosnia- 
 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia. It  
 
aimed to bring cooperation and peace to the Balkans”  (Eroglu Z., 2005, pp. 78-79).  
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All the above could be considered as key steps of the Turkish governments to  
 
emphasize the European and Balkan -at the same time- character of their country and  
 
also their ability to influence such developments. Süleyman Demirel at the 9th  
 
International Conference of the Balkan Political Club emphasized that  
 
“the settlement of conflicts, overcoming economic difficulties and  
 
ensuring the political stability and rule of law in the region is a priority we all share” 
(Demirel S., 2006),  
 
confirming thus his country’s role as a regional power and a peace-maker.  
 
 Turkey’s Foreign policy has not changed dramatically as far as the Balkans  
 
concerned, since Erdoğan took up power. His main concerns are still political stability  
 
and security in the region. However, Turkey’s role in this objective has become quite  
 
prominent.   
  
Current Turkey’s Balkan policy is defined clearly by the Minister of Foreign  
 
Affairs through a speech given on “Relations with the Balkan region”, 
 
“developing relations to the highest level with the Balkan countries, with which Turkey has  
 
historic, cultural and humanitarian ties; enhancing the existing atmosphere of regional peace  
 
and stability; keeping the transportation connection of Turkey with Western and Central  
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Europe open” (Davutoğlu A., Republic of Turkey.Ministry of Foreign Affairs),  
 
and another one on the Conference “Ottoman legacy and Balkan Muslim Communities  
 
today”,  
 
“The Balkan region is a buffer zone in a geopolitical sense….The Balkan region has been a  
 
region of transaction in the geo-economic sense…The Balkan region is a geo-cultural  
 
interaction region…If you have a region with the three characteristics ….either you can be  
 
the center of world politics or you will have to be the victim of world competition…Ottoman  
 
history is the history of the Balkan region…We can reestablish this success through creating  
 
an original ownership, through creating a new multicultural coexistence and through  
 
establishing a new economic zone…” (Davutoğlu A., "Ottoman legacy and Balkan Muslim 
Communities today", 2009) 
  
Turkish foreign policy is based on the Ottoman legacy discourse, its main interests  
 
within the region are in geopolitics and geo-economics and even in reviving  
 
multiculturalism, so as to provide stability and security to the region. In such an  
 
environment can political and economic cooperation flourish. Turkey’s activities  
 
towards this aim are following:  
 
In recent years, Turkey has strengthened its military and defense links with all  
 
Western Balkan countries. Turkey has invested successfully in Albania, FYROM and  
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina , mainly in the communication, banking, construction, mining  
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and retail sectors. Free trade agreement have been signed between Turkey and most  
 
Balkan countries during the last decade. Moreover, Turkey has greatly supported  
 
educational improvement and cultural initiatives within the Balkans. A reconstruction  
 
of historic Ottoman monuments is under way, while schools and universities have  
 
been built due to Turkish initiative (Petrovic Z. & Reljic D., 2011, p. 166). Added to  
 
that, scholarships to undergraduate and postgraduate students and language study  
 
courses have been offered in Serbia. It is also well-known that Turkey has supported  
 
Albanian education and military training for years. Similarly, FYROM has been  
 
provided with military equipment and training due to the Turkish contribution.  
 
Furthermore, Turkey provides training for young Bosnia and Herzegovina military  
 
professionals, scholarships to Bosnia and Herzegovina nationals for the Turkish  
 
military high school or the military academy (Petrovic Z. & Reljic D., 2011, p. 167)  
 
(Larrabee S. & Lesser I., 2003, pp. 94-96). 
 
 Recently, due to the Turkish contribution, the Serbian Parliament apologized  
 
for the Srebrenica massacre in 1995 and  both Serbian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian  
 
Presidency gave signs of reconciliation. However, rhetoric on Turkey’s longing for  
 
its Ottoman grandeur and the perception that Turkey favors the Bosnian side hinder  
 
closer ties with the region (Kart E., 2010).   
 
Turkey-Greece 
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It is common knowledge that Greece and Turkey have a legacy of conflicts  
 
during their long neighborliness. However, tension periods were followed by period  
 
of cooperation and understanding. Each country has been of major strategic  
 
importance for the other. According to the scholar Tsakonas , most of the conflicting  
 
issues that created Aegean dispute are not only issues of geostrategic importance, but  
 
also of geo-economics (Τσάκωνας Π., 2006, σ. 126).  
 
The great outbreak between Turkish-Greek relations happened in 1974, when  
Turkish troops invaded in the Cyprus Island and the militarized the northern part of it. 
It was the time when the Greek press first referred to the term “Neo-ottomanism”,  
thus characterizing Turkey’s use of hard power. For the following years a series of  
naval challenges in the Aegean took place intensifying hostility between the two  
countries. The same year, 1974, a Turkish hydrographic ship reached Greek  
continental shelf followed by 32 military ships, but a turmoil was prevented.  
 
Another challenge was during the summer of 1976, when the hydrographic ship,  
 
“Sismic”, reached almost the center of the Aegean Sea. (Ευσταθιάδης Σ., 4.6.2006) .  
 
On March 1987 the hydrographic ship “Piri Reis” followed by five military ships  
 
reached even the Athos peninsula. The two countries came to the brink of war.  
 
Journalist Alan Cowell reported for the New York Times : 
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“The crisis seemed to pull Greece and Turkey, who are nominal allies within the North  
 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, back from the brink of hostilities. On Friday both sides  
 
threatened military action in a test of wills over the right to drill for oil in disputed Aegean  
 
waters…The critical development in easing the crisis, foreign diplomats said, came Friday  
 
night when Prime Minister Turgut Ozal of Turkey, under pressure from the United States and  
 
other NATO nations, ordered a Turkish seismic research vessel to avoid the disputed waters  
 
around three Greek Aegean islands, Lesbos, Lemnos and Samothrace…Mr. Papandreou told  
 
reporters today that he felt “restricted optimism” about the crisis ….” (Cowell A., Greeks  
 
and Turks ease Aegean crisis, 29.3.1987).  
 
Following the crisis of 1987, a meeting of Turkish and Greek Prime Minister  
in Davos, Özal and Papandreou respectively, initiated a dialogue between the two  
countries, at least on “low” politics issues. However, the so-called “Davos spirit”  
 
faded out as no initiative has been taken by either Greece or Turkey (Bahcheli T.,  
 
2000, p. 147 ˙Larrabee S. & Lesser I., , 2003, p. 73-74).  
 
 In early 1990’s, during the Bosnian war Turkey’s active policy in the Balkans  
 
was regarded by the Greek side as an indirect way of extending their influence to the  
 
North of Greek territory and the Balkans in general. In addition to that, some Greeks  
 
even imagined that Turkey’s ultimate plan in internationalizing the issue of the  
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Muslim minority of Greece and presenting themselves as protectors of the minority  
 
was the restoration of Turkish sovereignty in Western Thrace (Larrabee S. & Lesser  
 
I., Relations with Greece and the Balkans, 2003, p. 95). Since, Turkey has joined all  
 
peace-making initiatives of international organizations and also Greece’s influence  
 
was increasing in the region, at least for the second half of the decade, such a threat  
 
was averted.  
 However, a new series of challenges has risen since that time, mainly  
concerning the Aegean. The ratification by the Greek Parliament on 1 June 1994  
of the International Law of the Sea, which acknowledged to the countries who signed  
it the right to establish territorial seas of “a maximum breadth of twelve miles from  
the baselines” (Bahcheli T., 2000, p. 134) , was followed a week later by a Turkish  
resolution that extension of Greek territorial seas to twelve miles, would be  
considered as a casus belli. In reality, Greek extension of its territorial sea in the  
Aegean beyond six miles, even in twelve, would block Turkey’s access to its major  
ports. The territorial extension applies also to aircraft. The Greek proposal for a ten- 
mile airspace was totally rejected, as airspace should correspond to  its territorial seas  
six miles. FIR intervention is another “hot” issue. Turkish state aircrafts often go  
through the Greek territory, while military aircrafts have no flight plans. Aerial  
challenges between the two countries have not stopped until today. This casus belli  
rhetoric has been an obstacle in any attempt of solving the Aegean dispute (Bahcheli  
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T., 2000, pp. 134-135 ˙Larrabee S. & Lesser I., 2003, pp. 74-75˙Τσάκωνας Π., 2006,  
p. 130).  
In 1996 Turkey and Greece faced another major crisis over an Aegean islet off  
the Turkish coast, known as Imia/Kardak, when Turkish journalists on 27th January  
 
1996 lowered the Greek flag and raised a Turkish one on the Imia. The next day the  
 
Greek Navy lowered the Turkish one and raised a Greek flag. Turkish military ships  
 
and aircraft were moving beyond the six miles, thus they violated Greek territory. The  
 
crisis was deescalated with the withdrawal of both forces from the area. The Greek  
 
view was that Greek sovereignty was challenged over this matter. Later, the Turkish  
 
leaders announced a list of uninhabited Aegean islets, challenging thus their  
 
sovereignty, known as “gray areas” (Bahcheli T., 2000, p. 136).  
 
According to Richard Holbrooke, American diplomat and former US Minister of  
 
Foreign Affairs,  
 
“Greek-Turkish relation saw signs of reviving of hostility and passion between both countries,  
 
hidden in nationalist form, signs similar to that which had poisoned the Balkans and parts of  
 
the Central Europe in post-Cold war Europe…” (Παπαχελάς Α., 10.5.1998).  
 
The Turkish-Greek relations reached a dead end when it became known that  
 
it was the Greek government that provided finally a shelter to the expelled PKK  
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leader, Abdullah Öcalan at its embassy in Nairobi. Although this involvement of the  
 
Greeks to Turkey’s “internal” problems infuriated the Turkish side and, confirmed,  
 
according to their view, Greece’s relations with PKK terrorism on plans against  
 
Turkey , an open conflict was prevented (Bahcheli T., 2000, p. 144).  
 
In addition to that the “earthquake diplomacy” developed, when both countries  
 
experienced earthquakes, aid was given by both sides and consequently  changed the   
 
climate in Greek-Turkish Relations. In 1999 Helsinki Summit, Greece lifted finally its  
 
veto on Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership. However, only on the condition that  
 
there should be a settlement of all Aegean issues by the International Court of Justice  
 
until 2004 and also that there wouldn’t be any restriction concerning Cyprus’  
 
accession, whether there would be a solution to the Cyprus issue or not. In this  
 
respect, Turkish accession to the European Union “is by no means a foregone  
 
conclusion”, as I. Lesser noted (Lesser I., Greece's New Geopolitical Environment,  
 
2005, p. 350). It was expected by the Greek side that an EU candidate country would  
 
adopt a milder policy towards an EU member state, in particular, Greece (Τσάκωνας  
 
Π., 2006, σσ. 135-136).  
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As  early as  2000 the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, G. Papandreou  
 
and I. Cem respectively, signed a number of bilateral agreements on low politics  
 
issues, such as tourism, civilization, environment, trade, multidimensional  
 
cooperation, organized crime, migration, drug smuggling and terrorism. In this  
 
respect, the Confidence Building Measures dialogue reactivated between the two 
 
countries. At first, measures were taken just for the strategic section, later both 
 
countries consented that there should be also measures concerning tension scaling and  
good neighborliness (Τσάκωνας Π., 2006, σσ. 138-139) .  
 In 2002-2003 negotiations started between Turkey and Greece in order to  
come to an end with the Aegean and others disputes. In this respect, Ismail Cem,  
Minister of Foreign Affairs reported that : 
“What I envisage here is a different method of addressing the issue of Cyprus…What would 
facilitate a positive outcome would be for each party to respect the other’s main sensitivity…” 
(Cem I., 14.5.2002) 
Turkey, under AKP rule, was intended to solve the Cyprus issue, a main obstacle for  
Turkey’s EU accession (Robins P., 2007, p. 297).However, neither this process nor  
the revision of the Annan Plan for Cyprus, were meant to end up this dispute.  
Also, in 2004, a change of Greek government abolished the time limit of 2004  
for the resolution of the Aegean dispute or the Cyprus issue implemented to Turkey.  
As a result of that, Turkey has more time to enter its reforms into force and solve  
disputes with neighboring countries. Greece has adopted a milder attitude towards  
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Turkish challenges (Ευθυµίου Π., 16.1.2005). We could say that there is a Greece- 
Cyprus-Turkey disputes’ axis and their solutions.  
Overall, Turkey’s foreign policy could be characterized as assertive. On the  
other hand, Greece’s concern on possible threats of its sovereignty , has led to an  
overextension of equipment . Although most of their disputes are presented as threats  
of territorial integrity for each other, however Papachelas claimed (Παπαχελάς Α., Ο  
πόλεµος του πετρελαίου στο Αιγαίο, 2000) that the main factor for Turkish-Greek  
conflicts is the existence or possible existence of an amount of oil resources within the  
Aegean. In that sense, both countries claim for themselves their share and their living  
space in the region. 
Recently, Turkish pro-active foreign policy has raised great criticism,  
skepticism and extravagant statements as far as Turkey’s intentions concerned. Neo- 
ottomanist discourse rises again and is again associated with irredentism, at least by  
conservative circles of intellectuals.  
 
Turkey-Middle East 
 
Turkey traditionally followed a non-involvement and non-interference  
 
status in the Middle East. However, the governorship and presidency of Turgut  
 
Özal initiated a more active policy towards the region. His involvement in the Gulf  
 
War, his embargo on Iraq after the invasion in Kuwait, his engagement with Israel, as  
 
Syria and Iran were considered as PKK supporters, are all examples of this shift  
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(Martin L., 2006, p. 191). He also promoted successfully Turkish investment in the  
 
Middle East and vice versa. Özal also showed great concern for the safety and  
 
repatriation of Iraqi Kurds after the rebellion against Saddam Husayn (Kirisci K.,  
 
2000, pp. 39-40) . Özal’s death was followed by a restoration of former conservative  
 
thoughts for  the Middle East. Turkey adopted a reactive policy towards its challenges  
 
in the Middle East, which was considered as the major threat for its territorial  
 
integrity.  However, Erbakan’s openness to Islamic groups like Hamas, Lebanese  
 
Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood and Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front, as also his  
 
relations with Iran and Libya, challenged not only the domestic political system, but  
 
also the Arab world. Eventually, Erbakan was forced to resign under the pressure of  
 
military and dominant foreign policy makers (Kirisci K., 2000, pp. 42-43).  
 
Succeeding conciliation governments also adopted the diplomatic way of dealing with   
 
Middle East conflicts. However, it was not a successful one (Knudsen E., 2003, p.  
 
211).  
 
AKP’s rise to power initiated a new conception for Turkish-Middle East  
 
relations by promoting dialogue, conflicts resolution and democratic reforms in the  
 
region. Turkey is intended to play a role of regional leader and protector, based on  
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soft power and democratization, an example country for reforms, which combines  
 
secularism and Islamic values,  a bridge state, which connects East with the West  
 
and also a global player role, as regional conflicts like those of the Middle East affect  
 
global politics, global economy and so global security and stability (Aras B. &  
 
Gorener A., 2010, p. 81).  
 
Turkey has realized at least after Özal’s engagement with the region, the geo- 
strategic and geo-economic importance of Iraq. Turkey’s neutrality during Iraq-Iran  
war provided the country with an increasing energy transit and cross-border trade. As  
the embargo on Iraq after the Kuwait invasion became less tense, Turkey re-activated  
trade and energy transit routes with Iraq.  After the latest invasion in Iraq in 2003,  
Turkey was intended not only to contribute to Iraq’s reconstruction, but also to have a  
reason on political “reconstruction” of Iraq.  Turkey’s interest on Iraq is based not  
only on the fact that it is a border country for Turkey, but also for its Kurdish and  
Turcoman population . The de facto existence of an autonomous Kurdish government  
in Northern Iraq has been considered until recently as a threat for Turkey, as it used to  
be a shelter for PKK fighters, as a recognized autonomous Kurdistan would be a  
successful example for Turkish Kurds and Kurds of Southeast Anatolia to demand an  
enhanced autonomy, as  the location of a rich oil source would be under Kurdish  
control (Martin L., 2006, pp. 199-203 ˙ Bal I., Instability in the Middle East and the  
relevant role of the PKK, 2004, pp. 354-355).  Also, Turkey’s rhetoric on the  
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Turcomans’ interests pointed to an expansion of political influence in the region.  
Turkey’s recent   visit in Iraq and their approach with Kurdistan Regional  
Government has entered a new era for Turkey’s regional policy (Hale W., 2009, p.  
147).  
Turkish aspirations to actively contribute to political stability in Iraq has been  
realized through engagement with UN Security Council, the Organization of the  
Islamic Conference, Iraq’s neighbors and ethnic and religious groups in Iraq.  
In that sense, journalist Zeynalov remarked that “The increasing number of Turkish  
officials in international institutions is proof of Turkey’s rising profile in the world”  
(Zeynalov M., 21.11.2010).  It was also Turkish initiative that mobilized the Arab  
League and the Organization of Islamic Conference to ensure that Iraq’s national  
elections in 2005 would be fair (Aras B. & Gorener A., 2010, pp. 87-88).  
Turkey’s relations with Hamas and Fatah have raised sharp criticism.  
However, Davutoğlu’s intention was to prevent an engagement of Hamas with Iran- 
Syria-Hezbollah axis and also support reconciliation between them (Aras B. &  
Gorener A., 2010, p.87) 
As far as relation with Iran concerned, there is a rivalry between Iran and  
Turkey both in geo-politics and geo-economics, in particular energy politics. Both  
countries are interested in alternative pipeline routes from Caucasus and Central Asia.  
However, Turkey does not have any energy resources of its own and aims at ending  
energy dependency on Russia (Kirisci K., 2000, p. 44).  On the other hand, Iranian  
relations with PKK, as Iran was blamed for hidden support of PKK by providing  
equipment, health aid, economical support, military training, weapons and shelter,  
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destabilized the region (Martin L., 2006, p. 206). Iran’s accusations of Turkish  
support on Iranian opponents added to that. Also close relations between Turks and  
the Azeri minority of Iran evoked fears of pan-Turkist movements.  
Another conflict is Iran’s radical Islam to Turkey’s democracy. In 1997,  
Turkey and Iran cut off even their diplomatic relations under the pressure of Iranian  
ambassador on Turkey to implement Sharia2 (Martin L., 2006, p. 207 ˙Kirisci K.,  
2000, pp. 51-52). The political climate between the two countries changed after the  
rise of AKP in power. This change possibly led criticism on Turkey’s turning to the  
East and spread fears of adoption of Iranian radicalism by Turkey.  Common PKK  
threat even led to a “security cooperation memorandum” in 2008 between the two  
countries (Hale W., 2009, p. 154).  However, as Kirisci remarks,  
“Whatever the bilateral problems and regime differences, pragmatism and non- 
confrontation usually prevail in Turkish-Iranian ties” (Kirisci K., 2000, p. 52).  
It is thus more realistic to consider that it was common economic (pipeline politics),   
military (against PKK attacks) and defense (development of weapons of massive  
destruction) challenges that brought the two countries closer, rather than religion.  
 
2. Sharia is the religious law of Islam, which deals with many issues of everyday life, is 
considered to “derive from the Quran and the sayings, practices and teachings of the Prophet 
Mohammed”, for Turkey, which follows the liberal school of Islamic thought, implementation 
of Sharia is considered anachronistic, (Johnson T., 2010) 
 
 
Turkey following the “zero problems with the neighbors” policy and the vision for  
 
regional “security” aims at facing all these challenges. Abdullah Gül stated in  
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interview for Stephen Kinzer of The Guardian that  
 
“Iran had a right to develop nuclear energy but not nuclear weapons…Our values  
 
are different, but having a good relationship helps the stability of the region” (Gül,  
 
2008).  
 
 For Turkish- Syrian relations a turn of climate was usual. Syrian relations  
 
with PKK, economic support and military training of the major threat for Turkey’s  
sovereignty, escalated relations between the two countries. Also, the water resources  
dispute, the dispute for the Hatay province, an ex-Ottoman province, which is located  
in Turkish-Syrian borders,  the possession of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass  
destruction, are also considered as destabilizing factors.  Turkey and Syria even came  
to the brink of war in 1998, when Turkish military mobilized towards Turkish-Syrian  
borders, so that  Syria expel Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader from Damascus. That  
was what Syria actually did.  This decision initiated a new era in Turkish-Syrian  
relations, as military, economic and political cooperation was, since then,  under  
discussion.  In this respect, during the last years Turkey and Syria signed a free trade  
agreement and expressed their intentions to promote together peace and stability in  
the region (Kirisci K., 2000, pp. 46-47 ˙Martin L., 2006, pp. 211-215 ˙Knudsen E.,  
2003, pp. 206-211 ˙Aras B. & Gorener A., 2010, pp. 87-89). 
 In this respect C.Phillips reported for The Guardian that  
“In what marks a significant turnaround in relations, not only have the prospects for  
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conflict evapored but also Damascus and Ankara find themselves in an ever closer  
integrated relationship with economic, political and even military ties strengthening  
each year…” (Phillips C., 1.10.2009). 
He also emphasized that  
“Syria remains only one strand (admittedly a useful one) of a wider realist Turkish  
foreign policy…Turkey , in contrast, is an essential ingredient in Syria’s plans for  
international rehabilitation and economic recovery” (Phillips C., 1.10.2009).  
Turkey has also led the resolution process of the Syrian-Israeli conflicts, but didn’t  
 
manage to solve it. On the other hand, Turkish-Syrian relations have made an  
 
unexpected progress even in the division of Tigris and Euphrates waters, leaving aside  
 
for the time the Alexandretta/Hatay dispute (Hale W., 2009, p. 153).   
 
Turkey’s relations with Israel are on the base of geo-political, geo-economic  
 
and geo-strategic interests. Not until middle 1990’s did relations between Turkey and  
 
Israel make any progress. Turkey’s decision to take Palestinians’ side during the  
 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict in 1980’s led to the coolness of relations.  However,  
 
Turkey and Israel in 1996 have signed a series of agreements on military training,  
cooperation, equipment improvement and  free trade. It was considered that Turkey  
 
turned to Israel as a result of EU rejection to start accession negotiations process, so  
 
as to prevent political isolation.  
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Close relations between Turkey and Israel caused great concern not only to  
Syria, Iran and Iraq, but also to the Arab world (Martin L., 2006, pp. 217-218).  
However, the AKP government, as soon as it was firstly formed, faced a serious  
challenge : whether they should criticize Israeli hostilities towards the Palestinians or  
adopt a more pragmatist stance. For the first years, Erdoğan chose the latter (Robins  
P., 2007, pp. 299-300).  Recently, Turkey, confirming thus its role as a peace mediator  
in the region, initiated as series of activities , so that disputes between Israel and Syria  
and also –most ambitious- Israel and Palestinian would be solved. In this framework,  
did Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan characterize Shimon Peres’ attacks in Gaza as  
“crimes against humanity” at the World Economic Forum at Davos. Turkish-Israeli  
relations have become quite tense in the last years, challenging thus their relations  
with the USA, the other partner of Israel.  
Turkish relations with the Arab countries have been mainly trade relations.  
The secular character of Turkey and also its engagement with NATO and EU were  
not compatible with the Arab character3  (Knudsen E., 2003, p. 205).  
Until the Gulf War Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were the main supplier of oil for Turkey,  
while Turkey provided them agricultural products. In addition to that, a number of  
Turkish construction companies were activating in the region. During the Gulf War all  
these activities reduced to a remarkable extent (Kirisci K., 2000, p. 50). 
3. Turks considered Arab nationalism as a reaction to declining Ottoman Empire, (Bal I., 
Instability in the Middle East and the relevant role of the PKK, 2004, p. 356) 
 In the post 9/11 era, Turkey, supported by the USA, has presented itself as a role  
model for the Muslim world and lately for the Arab world in particular. However, it  
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was Turkey’s refusal to support with military means the Iraq invasion in 2003, that  
was considered as a positive factor in the strengthening of relations with the Arab  
world. Also, Turkey’s enhanced role in OIC and economic prospects to the West  
added to that (Onis Z. & Yilmaz S., , 2009, p. 10). Turkey has  
recently expressed its intentions to become “a source of inspiration” for the Arab  
world.  In Abdullah Gül’s exact words :  
“Our main task must start with breaking this deep-rooted alienation of the Islamic  
world as far as democracy and development are concerned…In recent years, Turkey  
has become a source of inspiration as a shining world of vibrant democracy and a  
flourishing free-market economy” (Gül, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2010) 
Knudsen has remarked the potential of Turkey to become a regional  
power and to spread its influence on political economic and cultural level, connecting  
East with the West rather than ignoring West for the East (Knudsen E., 2003, p. 213).  
 
Turkey-Caucasus-Turkic Republics 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of eight independent  
Countries in Caucasus and Central Asia region: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,  
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. Turkey was one of  
the first countries to recognize their independence. On the one hand, political and  
economic relations with these countries could be  a realistic goal. On the other hand,  
Turkey was deprived of its strategic role as a Western stronghold against the Soviets  
and Communism in general. As a result of the political vacuum that emerged, Turkey  
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had the opportunity to present itself as the model country for the newly independent  
Caucasian and Central Asian states, supported however by the West and strongly  
encouraged by the USA. Turkey considered it as an opportunity to enhance the  
country’s status as a regional power and prove itself  as a strategic partner for the  
West. While, the latter having realized the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of  
the region was intended to have access in it through Turkey and prevent an Iranian  
influence and consequently Islamic fundamentalism, in the region (Winrow G., 2000,  
pp. 116-117 ˙ Aydin M., 2003, pp. 139, 141-142 ˙ Onis Z., 2001, pp. 66,68 ˙ Baran Z.,  
2004, pp. 269-270 ˙ Bal I., Turkish model as a foreign policy instrument in post Cold  
war era, 2004, pp. 329-330).  
Therefore, the Turkish political system was presented as an ideal model for all  
these newly emerged, Muslim mainly, republics, as it was the only Muslim, secular  
state with a proximity, a developed market economy and co-operation  to the West ,  
and also a multi-party system (Bal I., Turkish model as a foreign policy instrument in  
post Cold war era, 2004, p. 331).  
 In that sense, Turkey could provide itself as an example for political and  
economic transformation to the region , according to the Western standards, adopted  
though by a Muslim country. Furthermore, Turkey had cultural and linguistic  
affinities with some of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. So,  
cooperation and understanding seemed more feasible. To this aim, Turkey took  
certain initiatives.   
 A Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency supported investments in  
the region. In 1992 the Black Sea Economic Cooperation was established as a Turkish  
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initiative   for the promotion of  economic, commercial and political cooperation  
among the countries of the Black Sea region and  included almost all Caucasian and  
Central Asian countries (Baran Z., Turkey and the Caucasus, 2004, pp. 270-271).  
Turkey also supported the integration of the Caucasus and Central Asia in the United  
Nations, the Council of Europe, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in  
Europe. As a NATO member, Turkey also supported a Partnership for Peace  
program of NATO, while they provided military training and equipment to Azerbaijan  
and Georgia. Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia continue until today.  
Also, Turkey constructed telecommunications and air links and also provided  
scholarships for university students, colleges in every Republic and training courses  
for diplomats and businessmen (Winrow G., 2000, p. 117).  
However, the “Turkish model” did not live up to the expectations neither of  
Turkey nor of the Turkic Republics4, Iran confirmed that there was no intention of  
them to play a leading role in Central Asia, so threat of radicalism was over,  and  
Western countries, decided to have direct control of power and economic benefits in  
the region, rather through Turkey (Onis Z., 2001, p. 69).  
 
4. The Republics realized that Turkish economy was not an ideal one and also they were not 
very keen on democratic reforms (Bal I., Turkish model as a foreign policy instrument in post 
Cold war era, 2004, pp. 338-339) 
 
 
Also, Russia reaffirmed two years after the collapse of the Union its interest on its  
“Near abroad”5. A great asset was Russian minority in the region, the long years  
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established economic and political system of Russia and also mistrust of Turkey’s  
power, success and intentions. On the other hand, Turkey’s intervening in domestic  
politics of the Turkic republics caused great criticism, as it revived fears of Pan- 
Turkism and also created an image of political control over the Republics, who have  
recently become independent (Aydin M., 2003, pp. 144-145).   
As a result of all that Turkey’s effectiveness of the “Turkish model” and  
popularity of the country in the region decreased significantly and Turkey’s objectives  
for  the Central Asian countries remained inactive. Turkey’s activity within the region  
was limited at regional or international organizations’ initiatives.  
However, rivalry between Russian Euro-asianism and Turkish   Neo-ottomanism  
also prevailed in the Caucasus, as Russia took Armenia’s side in the Nagorno- 
Karabakh conflict, while Turkey supported Azerbaijan.  
 Both Turkey and Russia soon realized that their influence in the region was  
limited and focused on Western-oriented policies (Tanrisever O., 2006, σ. 170) .  
However, the 9/11 events and the global war against terrorism “revived” the Turkish  
Model, which was called to materialize “Great Middle East Initiative”6.  
5.  This term is used to define, in this case, Russia’s sphere of influence, (Onis Z., Turkey and 
post-Soviet states: Potential and limits of regional power influence, 2001, p. 70) 
6. In this initiative, which aims at promoting liberal democracy, market economy and 
educational reforms, Turkey is considered to apply it and play the role of the peace mediator 
in regional conflicts (Bal I., Turkish model as a foreign policy instrument in post Cold war 
era, 2004, p. 343) 
Turkey during a period of widespread Islamophobia was presented as an intercultural  
mediator (Onis Z. & Yilmaz S., 2009, p. 11). It is evident thus that Turkey’s  
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position at the center of Eurasia is of major importance for global politics, global  
security and  energy resources (Turan G., Turan I., & Bal I., 2004, pp. 296-297).  
M. Aydin remarked that “The pipeline network is one of the key factors in  
securing and maintaining influence throughout the region” (Aydin M., 2003, p. 150).  
Turkey’s aspirations for the expansion of its regional influence, aim at having full  
control of such a pipeline network and thus becoming the most important energy  
transit country. In this framework, Turkey signed an agreement with Georgia and  
Azerbaijan for the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in 1999.This  
agreement aimed at assuring that the natural resources “would be developed and  
transported along commercially viable, secure and environmentally safe routes”  
(Baran Z., The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Implications for Turkey , 2005, p. 103) 
The pipeline starts from Baku, passed through Georgia and ends up to the port of  
Ceyhan, in the Mediterranean, connecting thus Central Asia and Caucasus with the  
markets of the  Western Europe (Baran Z., The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline:  
Implications for Turkey , 2005, pp. 107). Another route is Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum  
or  Shah Deniz gas pipeline, which transports Azerbaijani gas to the Southern Europe,  
while there is a project under discussion for Shah Deniz II. A recent project also under  
discussion is the Nabucco pipeline, with its complementary Italy-Turkey-Greece  
Interconnector and Trans Adriatic Pipeline, which is going to transport gas from the  
Caspian Sea or Iraq and Egypt to Central Europe. There is also the South Stream  
project, which aims to transfer gas from Russia to the Middle East through a Black  
Sea route. While intensification of relations between Turkey and the most energy rich  
countries, like Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan is a top priority for energy politics of  
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Turkey (Larrabee S., 2011, p. 106). 
Turkey’s objectives in following such an assertive energy policy are not only  
covering domestic energy needs and diversifying energy resources, but also reflect to  
the country’s vision to promote  regional integration and sustainable stability (Laciner  
S., 2009). In this framework should Turkey’s position towards the Georgia crisis7 in  
2008 be considered. According to Balcer (Balcer A., 2009, p. 83), the Caucasus  
Stability and Cooperation Platform, whose goal is to end regional conflicts with the  
aid of Turkish-Russian factor and to normalize relations between Turkey and  
Armenia, is an example of Davutoğlu’s proactive policy. While, Turkey’s  
rapprochement attempt with Armenia8 was intended not only to  solve out a frozen  
conflict in the region and provide stability and security to pipelines routes, but also  
become a success story for Turkey’s foreign policy (Saivetz C., 2009, p. 105).   
Turkey’s “zero problems with the neighbors” policy and their role as a peace  
mediator in  neighboring countries’ internal conflicts is expected to be accepted by the  
EU and the US in the short term and increase Turkey’s influence in Caucasus and  
Central Asia in the long term (Balcer A., 2009, pp. 82-83).  
 
7. Turkey criticized Russia’s attack on Georgia, when the latter challenged South Ossetia’s 
sovereignty, (Onis Z. & Yilmaz S., 2009, p. 18). 
8. Rapprochement didn’t go well as Turkey insisted on connecting the welfare of Turkish-
Armenian relations with the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,  (Meral Z. & Paris J., 
2010, pp. 108-109) 
As scholar Laçiner stated in  Hurriyet:  
“The Turks, in the existing scheme of things, are concentrating more on  
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the political and strategic means of pipelines than the economic dimensions of these  
projects” (Laçiner S., Turkey's pipeline politics, 2009).  
   
 Turkey-Russia 
 
Turkey until the collapse of the Soviet Union operated as a buffer-zone  
between Western-oriented Europe and Communist states. Since the collapse of the  
Union, Turkey warmed up relations with neighboring regions of Caucasus and Central  
Asia, ex-Communist states, however, some of them of Turkic origin. Russia only  
two years after the deconstruction of Soviet Union, claimed its role in its “Near  
abroad”. Russia claimed its economic and political interests in Central Asia and  
Caucasus and its intention to intervene in the region, whenever there is a conflict, as a  
peace-making force (Tanrisever O., 2006, pp. 155-156,163). 
This objective blatantly contradicted Turkey’s “Model” of governance, which  
aimed at economic liberation and democratization process for the region, under the  
guidance and influence of Turkic Republic. In that sense, Russia’s support of Armenia  
in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and support of PKK, as a response to Turkey’s  
support for Chechnya’s separatists could be considered as tension exacerbating  
factors.  
 In late 1990’s both Turkey and Russia realized that they have common  
economic interests, in that sense co-operation rather than rivalry would be more  
beneficial for  their bilateral relations. The effective economic relations of the two  
countries soon led to the improvement of political relations between them. In this  
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framework of cooperation and understanding a series of agreements has been signed  
between the two countries on economic and energy transit issues, as well as on  
terrorism, private information service and diplomatic passports  (Tanrisever O., 2006,  
pp. 174,178). The successful partnership was confirmed with a protocol for military  
cooperation and military training  (Tanrisever O., 2006, p. 181). While a “Joint  
Declaration on Strengthening of Friendship and Multiplan Cooperation”  in 2004 was  
directed to deeper relationship between the two countries. In that sense Abdullah Gül  
stated in Today’s Zaman : 
“…In this new era, our economic and commercial ties serve as the driving force behind our  
relations and a remarkable improvement can be seen in this field…With this in mind, I  
believe there are currently no political problems between the two countries…The stances both  
countries have developed toward international and regional issue overlap to a large extent.  
Regular consultation mechanisms are continuously employed at various levels between our  
foreign services…” (GÜL, 11.2.2009) 
However, Turkey’s strengthening of relations with Russia, also meant an increase in  
Turkey’s dependency on Russia. Russia is the second most important trade partner  
and the first energy supplier for Turkey, as also an important market for the  
construction field. Russia also supports Turkey’s development of nuclear power  
(Larrabee S., 2011, pp. 111-112).  
However, this is considered as detrimental in the long term for its regional  
aspirations. In this respect, what Turkey considers as its “strategic depth” is at least in  
the case of Caucasus and Central Asia considered by Russia as its sphere of influence. 
It seems that a new form of co-existence has emerged between the two countries. On  
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the one hand, there is economic and military cooperation between them. On the other  
hand, there is a competition between the two ex-Empires in the field of energy and  
soft power (Torbakov I., Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian  
Relations, 2007, p.3).  
Amanda Paul, journalist for Today’s Zaman characterizes Turkish-Russian relations  
as related on pragmatism :  
“While Turkey and Russia are getting closer and strengthening economic ties, it is still far  
from being a “strategic partnership” but more a result of common interests, which still very  
much tips in Russia’s favor, and Turkey should take care that Russia does not, as it is prone  
to, manipulate economic interests in order to create pressure on the political relationship” 
(Paul A., 17.2.2010) 
Although Blue Stream is one of the most important energy supplier for Turkey, many  
other projects for pipelines has been under discussion, excluding Russia (Onis Z. &  
Yilmaz S., Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in  
Turkey during the AKP Era, 2009, p. 10).  
While Russia has proposed its own projects instead of EU or US supported  
ones: to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan proposed the Baku-Novorossisk pipeline, to the  
Nabucco Pipeline the South Stream Pipeline, to the Samsun-Ceyhan Pipeline the  
Burgas-Alexandroupolis project was supported (Saivetz C., 2009, p. 97), Balcer A.,  
2009, p. 85, Torbakov I., Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian  
Relations, 2007, p. 8).  
Turkey implementing its “rhythmic diplomacy” tries to keep a balance  
between Russia and EU and US projects. Although a top priority in energy politics is  
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finding alternative routes or alternative energy sources, which are not linked with  
Russia, Turkey, as a potential energy hub, keeps in touch with Russian supply routes.  
 
Turkey-US 
 
Turkey’s relations with the US have always been of major importance in  
formation of Turkish foreign policy, while Turkey also has been a strategic partner for  
the US and NATO in respect of security, co-operation and Turkey’s geopolitical role  
(Lesser I., 2006, pp. 101-102). During the Cold War Turkey served as a buffer zone  
preserving any Communist intervention in  the Western-oriented world. Since the end  
of the Cold war Turkey has served as an important ally of the US, as its location at the  
center of a troublesome Middle East-Caucasus-Balkans axis  and its Westernization  
process have been compatible with US interests. According to Bal (Bal I., Turkey- 
USA Reltions and Impacts of 2003 Iraq War, 2004, p. 126), US support for Turkey’s  
EU membership should be regarded as a way for the USA “to monitor and influence  
developments within the EU”.  Also, Turkey as well as USA is a member of  
international organizations like NATO, OECD, OSCE, G-20.  Eurasia has been a  
region of increasing importance for regional and global security. Furthermore, this  
region emerged as an abundant source of energy resources. Turkey’s defense  
challenges, as the country is positioned in a troublesome neighborhood , whereas  
some of its countries developed or intended to develop weapons of massive  
destruction, have been faced to an important extent with the aid of  the US factor. In  
addition to that US support was extended beyond the security sphere of influence,  
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when that was needed, such was the case of US support for Turkey’s pipeline projects  
(Lesser I., 2006, pp. 105-107 ˙Bal I., Turkey-USA Reltions and Impacts of 2003 Iraq  
War, 2004, p. 130). The vagueness of political framework after the collapse of the  
Soviet Union forced Turkey to redefine its foreign policy, break its traditional  
neutrality toward external affairs and adopted an assertive foreign policy.  
Özal’s  neo-liberal orientation of economy, according to the US-model ,  
political and diplomatic cooperation characterized relations of the two countries. Not  
only did Turkey involve actively in the Iraq crisis, but also took part in the  
multilateral talks’ working groups, thus  was officially recognized as an important  
regional actor (Lesser I., , 2000, p. 206).   Furthermore, Turkey’s role has been  
enhanced as the country was seen as an ideal model for democratization, political and  
economical engagement with the West for the newly emerged Turkic Republics (Bal  
I., Turkey-USA Reltions and Impacts of 2003 Iraq War, 2004, p. 125).   
Also, Turkey’s location was strategic for pipeline politics too, as Turkey is an  
important energy transit and consumer country. (Lesser I., Beyond "Bridge or  
Barrier": Turkey's Evolving Security Relations with the West, 2000, p. 205-209). 
Turkey has supported US war against global terrorism. In fact, Turkey in this  
circumstances was presented by the US again as a model country for the Muslim  
world -as it was a secular, however Muslim, state with democratic principles- , in  
order to promote democratic reforms in the region, peace process and become a  
communication and financial bridge between East and the West. However, Turkey’s  
refusal to let US troops start the Iraq invasion through Turkish territory in 2003, was  
considered as a key step towards differentiation of interests between the two  
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countries. Such decision   is often interpreted within an Islamic context, as the AKP  
has been already in power. In that sense, it was not sensible for a country secular,  
though Muslim, which has been presented as a Model country for the region, to attack  
areas mainly inhabited by Muslim populations (Robins P., 2007, p. 294). 
Nevertheless, military and civilian logistic support reached Iraq through  
Turkish territory or airspace. While, the ‘Model partnership” discourse, initiated by  
President Barrack Obama and warmly accepted and supported by Turkish Foreign  
Minister Ahmet  Davutoğlu,  aimed at confirming strong US-Turkish political,  
diplomatic and economic ties. In this respect, scholar I. Lesser refers in Today’s  
Zaman that :  
 
“Obama’s visit managed to dispel some of the pervasive suspicion in US-Turkish relations – 
no small accomplishment. Much remains to be done, both bilaterally and in a transatlantic  
setting, to give these public diplomacy gains strategic meaning” (Lesser I., 17.4.2009).  
 
Also , Davutoğlu’s speech at the 28th Annual Conference on US-Turkish relations  
organized by ATC-DEIK on June 2009reflected such common vision :  
 
“We are not here not as officials but as aqn ATC family…..President Obama came to Turkey  
in April and made a very good, indeed an excellent speech in the parliament and he used a  
new terminology regarding Turkish-American relations…this time he preferred to use the  
term “Model partnership”…I thought that President Obama wanted to underline the unique  
character of this relationship…Now when we bring these two, being the unique characters of  
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Turkey and the US together, we see that because of these unique characters our relation is  
unique as well…For global and regional peace we need each other. Therefore, we should not  
only focus on the existing conjectural issue, but we have to have a long term strategic  
vision…Therefore, this relationship is a model partnership, because of this unique supportive  
character” (Davutoğlu, 2009) 
On the contrary, a serious development with a negative impact on Turkish-US  
relations was the break-up of Turkish-Israeli relations. The Turkish-Israeli relations  
have been supported or even promoted by the United States, as they serve its own  
defense interests in Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean (Lesser I., 2006, p. 111).  
What is remarkable is that Turkey’s decision has made it clear that the country is not a  
US representative in the region, but also can act unilaterally (Bal I., Turkey-USA  
Relations and Impacts of 2003 Iraq War, 2004, p. 149 ˙Noivo D., 2010, p. 30 ˙Onis  
Z. & Yilmaz S., 2009, p. 12).In that sense , Semih Idiz pointed out in Hurriyet that :  
 
“One could even say at this stage that the normalization of Turkish-Israeli ties has become a  
kind of a precondition for the normalization of Turkish-US ties, and until that happens it  
seems that Ankara’s relations with Washington will not carry the “strategic value” they may  
have had in the past….In the mean while the Obama administration and the Erdogan  
government will try and muddle through in an effort to ensure that ties are not totally  
disrupted, given the many vital issue that make it essential that both countries are still  
cooperating…this can hardly be called a “strategic relationship” anymore”  (Idiz S., 
2.9.2010).  
It is obvious then that there is a shift on Turkey’s model partnership with the United  
States, however, not a complete shift of interests and orientation.  
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Turkey-EU 
 
There is a consensus that Neo-ottomanism is just a reaction to EU’s skepticism  
for Turkish membership. Therefore, it is essential that a brief overview to Turkey’s  
EU accession long history is given.   
Turkey’s ambivalent relationship with the EU dates back to 1959, when  
Turkey applied for associate membership to the European Economic Community. In  
1964 the Ankara Agreement was signed, which brought up expectations for possible  
membership of Turkey. However, Turkey’s first application to accede EU made  
in 1987 by Turgut Özal was rejected. Although a Customs Union between EU and  
Turkey was established in 1995, Turkey was not going to be recognized as a candidate  
member until 1999. The accession negotiations started only in 2005. In this context,  
Turkey should open and close 35 chapters in order to become a full member.  
Although some of them have opened most of them are blocked by EU  
members and only a limited number is closed. EU’s skepticism is considered to be  
based more on the definition of European identity rather than on Turkey’s fulfillment  
of Copenhagen criteria. What is also important is that there is one thing “An EU which  
stops at the Bosporus…than one which pushes into Central Asia and embraces the  
Middle East” (Walker J., 2007).  On the other hand, Turkey’s frustration is reflected  
to its new foreign policy. Also, negative representations by Western media of  
Turkey’s internal political crisis and the argument of imperative resolution of Cyprus  
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issue, as a precondition for Turkey’s accession, added to that.  Although EU accession  
still is considered as a major factor of Turkish foreign policy, it has lost its position as  
first priority initiative (Onis Z. & Yilmaz S., 2009, pp. 13-14 ˙Noivo D., 2010, pp. 25- 
27).   
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu clearly stated : 
“Turkey is no reorienting its foreign policy, as some argue nowadays…Membership in the EU  
is Turkey’s strategic choice and this objective is one of the most important projects of the  
Republican era…” (Davutoğlu A., Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010, 2010) 
Neo-ottomanism has been regarded as an aggressive foreign policy both in  
1990’s and in contemporary Turkey.  It has been associated with expansionist  
aspirations , as statements like “ From Adriatic to China” defining thus Turkey’s  
extension of interests and also Özal’s prediction that the 21st century would be “the  
century of the Turks”, could easily be misinterpreted. However, what is important to  
remember is that Özal believed that his political and economic interaction with  
Eurasia, Middle East and other region, with which they have cultural ties, would give  
Turkey economic development and political; power, so that they would have another   
chance to challenge EU membership an enhanced status (Laciner S., The Journal of  
Turkish Weekly , 2009).  
 Although Neo-ottomanism faded out gradually in the succeeding governments,  
the European orientation of Turkey remained. After the absolute turn to Islamism and  
Islamic countries during Erbakan’s government, it was  Erdoğan’s foreign policy that  
turned the country from Europhobia to Europhilia. What is remarkable is his  
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insisting on EU’s commitment to name a date, after  which negotiations could start 
(Robins P., 2007, p. 292).   
On the other hand, Neo-ottomanism today is not that euro-centric, on  
the contrary, we could say  that embrace multiple regions interests (Fisher Onar N.,  
2009). Today Turkey having understood its important geopolitical position, having a  
strong economy and an improving democratization process aims at strengthening or  
even developing economic, political, diplomatic ties with neighboring countries and  
regions. This policy, characterized as “economic interdependence” as an experimental  
opening of Turkish economy to other than European market.  Therefore, a “rhythmic  
diplomacy” and a “balance of security” are also main principles of Turkish foreign  
policy .  However, what is most worrying for the EU is Turkey’s Neo-ottomanist  
rhetoric, as it is often connected with irredentism and a total shift of Turkish foreign  
policy to rediscover its “Muslim” self (Noivo D., 2010, p. 28). Turkish relations with  
Hamas, re-strengthening of relations with Syria and Iran and also coolness of relations  
between Turkey and Israel reflect such tendency. Daniel Steinvorth reported for Der  
Spiegel that  
“As European opposition to EU membership for Turkey grows, Ankara is looking to forge  
closer ties to its neighbors…Europe, with its fondness for criticizing Turkey, is increasingly  
become  yesterday’s ideal” (Steinvorth D., 11.12.2009).  
The majority of the press warns the politicians that there is high possibility  
that they could lose Turkey as a security and economic partner and so consequences  
could be quite harsh for  the European Union. On the other hand, they are of the view  
that Turkey has, actually, no other alternative than the EU and soon they would  
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realize that. It is evident then, that, a negative or positive stance of Turkey towards  
Europe is defined by the effectiveness of its diplomacy (Noivo D., 2010, p. 28).  
 
The challenges for Turkish Foreign Policy 
 
Turkey’s re-orientation as a regional power and an important global actor has  
caused serious concern to its allies and also to countries with which they have  
conflicting interests. This enhanced status has also created new opportunities and new  
obligations for the country. It is vital that a new strategic plan should be implemented  
in order to face all challenges and take advantage of all opportunities given. 
 Turkey’s Western orientation has been differentiated recently. This has caused  
a discourse that “Europe is losing Turkey” and is gradually adopting radical Islam.  
Another view was that Turkey is drafting away from Europe and the West in general  
as a reaction to EU’s negative stance for Turkey’s full membership. However, Turkish  
leadership of foreign affairs denies any shift from Turkey’s main priority, EU  
membership. 
 EU has implemented a number of reforms, so that Turkey could join the  
Union as a full member. The Copenhagen criteria in brief include “stability of  
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for  
and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to  
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union” (Morelli V.,  
2011, p. 1). Although Turkey has successfully promoted democratization process and  
economic development,  there are also main obstacles  to achieve its goal, most  
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important are human rights, the Kurdish and the Cyprus issue.   
The human rights performance is considered to be quite low in Turkey. There  
 
have been reported unlawful killings, cases of torture and abuse by security forces,  
 
also  imprisonment of conscientious objectors  (Amnesty International, 2010, p.2 ˙  
 
European Parliament.Human Rights Committee, 2010, p.5,10-12).  Despite  
 
improvements on prison conditions, they remain poor, overcrowded and with  
 
insufficient staff. There were reports that state officials could have influenced the  
 
independence of the judiciary through their statements. While, close relationships  
between judges and prosecutors continued to hinder the right to a fair trial (European  
 
Court of Human Rights, 2011). The government has limited the freedom of  
 
expression through the use of constitutional restrictions and numerous laws  
 
(Hammarberg T., 2011). Press freedom has declined and there are also limitations on  
 
Internet freedom. Courts and an independent board ordered telecommunications  
 
providers to block access to Web sites on numerous occasions.  However, the media  
 
criticized government leaders and policies daily and in many cases adopted an  
 
offensive role with respect to the government (Kanli Y., Empire of fear or the AKP's  
 
Turkey, 12.11.2009). Violence against women, including honor killings and rape,  
 
remain a widespread problem (Human Rights Watch, 2011). While, child marriage  
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persists reaching a 37% on average and increasing to 68% in Southeast Anatolia,  
 
despite laws prohibiting it (Emeksiz I., 5.10.2010˙BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY,  
 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2011, p. 1).  
 
As far as minority rights concerned, ethnic religious and linguistic minorities  
(Alevis, Yezidis, Assyrians, Catholics, Protestants, Kurds, Jafaris, Circassians, Laz, or  
Roma) not referred to the Lausanne Treaty, are not recognized as such, thus depriving  
them of certain rights. In addition to that they are continually under pressure to  
assimilate (BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2011,  
pp. 37-38 ˙Jarosławski S., 2008).   
The Cyprus issue, whose resolution is a major priority for the EU, is another  
obstacle for Turkey’s foreign policy. It seems as if the Cyprus issue is blocking  
Turkey’s accession. Although negotiations have started, a limit number of chapters of  
acquis have opened and only a few closed successfully. Cyprus is a full member of  
the EU and recognition of all member states is a necessary component of the  
accession process. Turkey is also obliged to open its ports and air bases to the Greek- 
Cypriot side of the island. Turkey was also called to remove its military forces from  
the island. Turkey’s negative stance towards these obligations “froze” practically  
negotiations with Europe in the recent years. While, political analysis of the issue  
observes that no solution of the Cyprus problem would be equivalent to no full EU  
membership for Turkey (Morelli V., 2011, pp. 2-9 ˙Kutlay M., 2009˙The Economist- 
Special report, 2010).  
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The Kurdish issue, is also connected with human rights, stability and security  
in the country and the region, which are prerequisites for the country’s  development.  
 
The Kurdish minority of Turkey represents a large ethnic and linguistic group. Until  
 
recently, Kurds did not have the right to publicly or politically express their Kurdish  
 
identity or speak  Kurdish in the public domain , otherwise there was the risk of  
 
censure, harassment, or prosecution. Latest constitution reforms has abolished such  
 
discriminations. Turkish Kurds mainly through their parliamentary members demand  
 
that the Kurdish dominated regions in Southeast Turkey should have an autonomy  
 
status , that Kurdish education should be in Kurdish language, also that they should  
 
not be excluded from Turkish citizenship in the new Constitution for not belonging to  
 
the Turkish ethnicity (Barkey H. & Kadioglu D., Carnegie Endownment, 2011  
 
˙Larrabbe S. & Tol G., 2011, pp. 148, 150).   
 
An unsuccessful solution to the problem and incomplete response to the  
 
Kurdish requests through the new Constitution could be risky, as there is always the  
 
possibility of an uprising of the domestic Kurdish minority, challenging thus  
 
constitutional legitimacy, political stability and Turkey’s vision to provide itself as a  
 
successful democracy, which should be an example for the reforms in the Middle East  
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(Larrabbe S. & Tol G., 2011, p. 141).  
 
Another challenge for Turkey is the PKK attacks. A war started in 1984,  
 
officially ended after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, however in practice they still  
 
organize small-scale border attacks against Turkish targets.  A solution of the Kurdish  
 
issue without taking account of the PKK side is inevitable. However, entering  
 
dialogue process with the PKK is an ambitious and not easily accessible project  
 
(Larrabbe S. & Tol G., 2011, p. 150˙Yetkin M., 29.9.2011).   
 
On the other hand, relations between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds have warmed up,  
 
as both sides realized the benefits of co-operation, especially in the economic sector  
 
(Barkey H., Turkey's New Engagement in Iraq, 2010, p.2-3). Some analysts show this  
 
development as an indirect way to solve the Kurdish issue (Özerkan F., 2010).  
 
Civilian control of military intervention in politics has added greatly to this approach  
 
(Yinanç B., 1.4.2011), as their perception that recognition of Kurdistan Regional  
 
Government would threaten Turkey’s security, stability and territorial integrity, was  
 
widespread in the country until recently(Larrabbe S. & Tol G., 2011, pp. 144-145 ).   
 
Also, Turkey’s foreign policy principles for “zero-problems” with neighbors,  
 
maintaining “security balance” in the region and “developing relations with  
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neighboring regions”, all reflect to this political movement. Also, Turkey’s economic  
 
expansion to its neighboring Northern Iraq is remarkable. The majority of their  
 
imports come from Turkey.  Numerable construction and oil exploration Turkish  
 
companies operate in this region (Fielding-Smith A., 14.4.2010). Turkey is considered  
 
as one of the most important gateways to Iraqi oil. Therefore, ensuring security and  
 
stability in the region is of vital importance for Turkey (Hale W., 2009, p. 146).  
 
In terms of geo-politics and geo-economics Turkey is facing great challenges  
 
with its neighboring states of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Israel. Turkey faces challenges of  
 
political legitimacy through the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, of national security as  
 
neighboring countries possess ballistic missiles, of sovereignty through the rise of   
 
Kurdish nationalism (Martin L., 2006, p. 196).  
 
On the one hand, Turkey is dependent on the Middle East to a great extent for  
 
its energy resources, on the other hand the region is the largest energy source in the  
 
world. In this respect, Turkey’s role as a peace mediator in the region is not only  
 
important, but also vital for its own interests.  
 
This applies mainly to Iraq (Hale W., 2009, p. 146). Although relations  
 
between Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government has been improved in the  
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recent years, KRG’s claims for incorporation of Kirkuk remain unsolved (Hale W.,  
 
2009, p. 148 ˙Barkey H., Turkey's New Engagement in Iraq, 2010, p. 4). The  
 
existence of a strong and stable government in Iraq, could thus not only provide  
 
regional peace and stability, but also encourage economic development and the  
 
realization of Nabucco Pipeline Project (Hale W., 2009, pp. 146). Also, Turkey’s  
 
rapprochement with Armenia towards a solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict aimed   
 
also at plurality and diversification of pipeline routes.  
 
While, Turkish-Israeli relations, a strategic partner both for Turkey and US,  
 
has reached a critical point by now, putting thus at risk also US-Turkish relations.  
 
Turkey’s initiative for bringing face to face Israeli and Palestinians into a dialogue  
 
process for their disputes, met little success. Turkey’s sympathy for Palestinians,  
 
protests against Iraqi attacks in Gaza, recently expressed at Prime Ministerial level ,  
 
but mainly the Mavi Marmara incident have dynamited relations between both  
 
countries (Villelabeitia I., 2011). Turkey also intervened as a mediator in the Israeli- 
 
Syrian dispute on the Golan Heights. However, governmental change in Israel abrupt  
 
this process (Hale W., 2009, pp. 149, 151).  
 
As far as Turkish-Iranian relations concerned, their enhanced relations caused  
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fear of the Western powers that Turkey is turning to radical Islam and intense concern  
 
of the neighboring countries for an imbalance of power and  share of energy resources  
 
in the region. Turkey’s relations with Iran follow an economy-security axis  
 
(Punsmann Gültekin B., 20.2.2011). On the one hand, Iran serves as an important  
 
energy supplier for Turkey, is an alternative to Russian energy dependency and favors  
 
Turkey’s ambitions for becoming the most important energy transit route to Europe.  
 
On the other hand, both Turkey and Iran agreed that Iraq’s partition would benefit the  
 
emergence of an independent Kurdish state, which would be disastrous for regional  
 
peace and security. Added to that, PKK attacks to both countries led to “security  
 
cooperation” between Iran and Turkey against the common enemy. However,  
 
Turkey’s main challenge in its relations with Iran is Iran’s nuclear programme (Hale  
 
W., 2009, pp. 153-155).  
 
The political fragility of the region serves as an excellent chance for Turkey to 
materialize its role as a regional power through its peace-making efforts and 
economical and political agreements, as also as a global actor, as some regional  
conflicts reflect also to global politics.  
 Lastly, the most recent incidents are to be discussed, as both have a dynamic  
and challenge Turkey’s regional role. The Arab Spring is a series of uprisings in  
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Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria against the contemporary regime. It is considered both by  
supporters and opponents of  Erdogan that such an environment paved the way for the  
Turkish Prime Minister to “test” his role as a regional leader and a peace mediator.  
While, Erdogan’s warnings on Assad’s regime to pull out his troops and bring peace  
and stability to his country is just an example of this potential role. Furthermore,  
Erdogan aims at preventing any Kurdish uprising. Although the people embraced his  
movement to visit those places and express his sympathy and support (Saleh Y., 2011)  
(Logan J., 2011), the press is quite critical of this (Bekdil B., Dear Arab brothers: Yes,  
you may borrow our prime minister!, 2011), as they observe the vulnerability of “zero  
problems with neighbors” and “security balance” policy (Idiz S., FM Davutoglu  
returns to the drawing board, 2011). 
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has already stressed the major geostrategic  
importance of Cyprus for Turkey, as it can 
 “influence strategic links between Asia and Africa, Europe and Africa and Europe  
and Asia…No global or peripheral power , who does strategic calculations in the  
Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, Suez Strait, the Red Sea and the  
Persian Gulf can ignore Cyprus” (Davutoğlu Α., 2010).   
Recently the Cyprus government began drilling for natural gas in its exclusive  
economic zone, southern of Cyprus. Turkey responded that such an action would be  
illegal and that it would hinder Turkey-Cyprus negotiations for a resolution (Kambas  
M., 2011).Turkey also claimed that they also have economic benefits and interests in  
the area and they even tried to prevent such activity by sending complementary naval  
force to the region. The outcome of all this mobilization is yet unknown.  
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 On the whole, Turkey’s foreign policy, because of its multi-dimensional  
character,  has opened many fronts  or intervened in already open fronts, thus facing  
multi-dimensional challenges, as well. Turkey’s peace-making initiatives, like those  
between Israeli and Palestinians and Israeli and Syrians, has not borne any fruits yet.  
However, any negative development could affect Turkey’s stability as well, as a  
Middle East country and a mediator. A consensus from both disputing sides is not to  
be taken for granted. On the other hand, Turkey has broken up traditional  
partnerships, like the one with US, in order to fix relations with the Arab world.  
However, this is far from “rhythmic diplomacy”.  Also, Turkey could hardly  
succeed in solving out regional disputes, unless it solves its internal problems first, as  
some internal problems, like its own disputes with neighboring countries and mainly  
the Kurdish issue,  are also regional problems. Lastly, Turkey’s most serious  
challenge is to face all the previously referred challenges in order to become a real  
regional power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
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The aim of this dissertation was to define the term “Neo-ottomanism”, its  
nature, the time of its emergence and the implications of it in Turkish foreign policy  
for the last two, at least, decades. Neo-ottomanism is based on the Ottoman legacy  
and the way it can affect or affects Turkish politics and society. The main argument is  
that Turks today, successors of a glorious Ottoman past, should redefine their position  
in regional and global politics, a prominent one, which derives from the successful  
past. The strengthening of ties with former Ottoman provinces, with which they share  
cultural, linguistic, religious characteristics, but most important a common past , in  
political, financial, diplomatic and cultural level, is the way through which Turkey  
would reaffirm its historical oriented role as a central, not peripheral country.  
 This discourse emerged more or less as a result of Turkey’s political and  
strategic redefinition after the end of the Cold war and ideological challenges after the  
dynamic outbreak of the Kurdish issue. It was Turgut Özal who initiated it, opening  
thus new horizons of political and economic activity, as he established relations with  
regions and countries beyond the traditional ones since the early Republic. However,    
Özal’s intention was to strengthen the country’s political status, as Turkey would be  
presented as the center of a regional political co-existence, and enhance Turkey’s  
economy, as he would develop economic interdependence, so that Turkey can apply  
with an upgraded status this time for EU accession. EU membership was considered  
as the political recognition of Turkey’s European identity and a prerequisite for the  
development of a strong economy. However, Turkey’s aspirations were soon  
associated with irredentism.  
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There is a consensus that the contemporary Minister of Foreign Affairs and  
advisor of Turkish Prime Minister since his first election , Ahmet Davutoğlu, is  
reviving Neo-ottomanism through his theory and practice of foreign policy. However,  
he denies such a characterization, as it has negative connotations. His “Strategic  
Depth” doctrine is based on the idea that Turkey’s historical and geographical depth  
prescribe for Turkey a central regional role and an enhanced status in global politics.   
His main principles for Turkish foreign policy are a) ensuring security in the region  
and in internal affairs, as a destabilized environment affects political health and  
development b) having zero problems with neighbors and even solving conflicts  
between neighbors as a third party, proving thus the country’s central role c)  
developing relations with neighboring regions and beyond, proving thus that Turkey  
is not just a bridge between East and West d) adopting a multi-dimensional foreign  
policy rather than a monolithic one, e) having rhythmic diplomacy, proving Turkey as  
an important global actor. His strengthening of relations with the Islamic world has  
evoked criticism throughout the EU and US that Turkey is drifting away from Europe  
and turns to the East. However, Turkey’s Western orientation has not changed, what it  
lacks is its enthusiasm. 
 However, Turkey’s relations with other regions or individual countries have  
changed throughout the period under discussion.  The political vacuum created as a  
result of the collapse of the Soviet Union has reformed Turkish foreign policy , as it  
no longer consist the Western buffer zone against Communism,  new independent  
states have emerged and the New World Order dictates new challenges. In this  
framework, Turkey decides to adopt a proactive foreign policy, re-discovers its  
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historical, cultural, linguistic affiliation with neighboring regions like the Balkans,  
Caucasus and Central Asia and religious ties with the Arab World and also its position  
as a Middle East country. Furthermore, Turkey redefines relations with traditional  
rivals like Greece and Russia and traditional allies, like the USA. Even more Turkey  
intensifies its efforts for EU accession.  
 In the Balkans, the support of all Muslim populations and of all minorities in  
turbulent times has caused great concern and fears of imposed political influence,  
while during peace periods Turkey’s initiatives for reconstruction are welcomed.  
What is still irritating is Turkey’s intervention in internal political affairs of the  
region. On the other hand, the Turkish model proposed for the political  
technical economic construction of Caucasus and Central Asia met little success in  
early 1990’s , while Turkey is today one of the most important energy transit  
countries and energy consumer of natural resources deriving from this region.  
Turkey’s ambition to become an energy hub, has led to a strategic partnership with  
the most important energy supply countries.  
As far as relations with the Middle East and the Arab world concerned,  
Turkey has been presented as a model country , a secular and Muslim country , with  
democratic institutions and Islamic values, open to Western markets, at least three  
times during the period under consideration: the first was after the end of the Iran-Iraq  
war, the second after the 9/11 incidents, the third as a result of Turkey’s new foreign  
policy. Turkey’s peace-making efforts for both its disputes with regional countries  
and for interregional conflicts, its coolness with Israel, its enhanced role in OIC and  
its contacts with other regional organizations, all added to Turkey’s central role in the  
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region.  
In Greek-Turkish relations Neo-ottomanism and Turkey’s assertive policy in  
general has evoked a lot of tension. Turkey’s proactive policy had been characterized  
“Neo-ottomanist” since Turkey’s invasion in Cyprus in 1974 and the existence of  
Turkish troops on the island. Also, Turkey’s support for the Muslims in the Balkans  
has been considered as an irredentist movement from the Greek side. So, do  
Davutoğlu’s statements for a reconstruction of the Balkans, based on a common  
Ottoman past,  today. On the other hand, the casus belli declaration and naval and  
airspace challenges, prevented a “zero problems with the neighbors” reality.  
For Russian-Turkish relations, Neo-ottomanism has been the ideological rival  
of Russia’s Euro-asianism. However , Russian-Turkish relations are based since late  
1990’s on pragmatism. On the one hand, they are trade partners and cooperate in the  
military field, on the other hand there is a rivalry in the energy section.  
 As far as Turkish-US relations concerned, Turkey’s foreign policy has been  
more or less in tune with that of the United States, at least until recently. Thus,  
Turkey’s Neo-ottomanism served US interests in the Middle East, as Turkey has been  
presented as a model country towards reforms, peace and democratization, in Eurasia,  
so as to prevent a threat of radical Islam,  in the Islamic world in general. However,  
Turkey’s latest unilateral initiatives in the Middle East have caused serious concerns  
for the future of their relations.   
 For Turkish-EU relations Neo-ottomanism has been regarded as an alternative  
or re-action to Euro-skepticism. In fact, Neo-ottomanism during Özal’s era was  
considered as an initiative aimed at developing a competitive economy and enhancing  
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the country’s political status, so that they could challenge EU membership again,  
however not as a second class country. However, it would be too simplistic to  
consider Neo-ottomanism today as a reaction to EU long pending membership.  
Although Western orientation has not shifted, EU is not considered as a first priority  
policy anymore. This is what leads Europeans observers to believe that Turkey is  
drifting away from the West. 
 However, Neo-ottomanism through its multi-dimensional character does give  
many opportunities, but it also faces some serious challenges. The most important  
ones, lie on Turkey’s formation of the Republic and its imminent Constitution reform.  
They are associated with the definition of Turkish citizenship and the decision on  
whether or not the Kurds should be regarded as full citizens of the country. However,  
Neo-ottomanism is related to multiculturalism and peaceful multi-ethnic co-existence.  
So, a negative outcome in this section of Constitution’s reform would be regarded as  
self-cancellation of Neo-ottomanist policy. On the other hand, it is hard to understand  
that a country protests against the violation of human rights in other countries, while  
itself has reports on various human rights violations. Also, Turkey’s effectiveness as a  
peace mediator has not  born any fruits yet. While, Assad’s, a friend and ally of  
Turkey, growing aggressiveness in Syria, raises serious doubts on that. While,  
Turkey’s assertiveness is regarded lately as shifting from “zero problems with  
neighbors” policy in dealing with regional conflicts.  
In, conclusion based on the issues discussed in this dissertation, we could say  
that Neo-ottomanism has emerged  as a term used to define Turkey’s assertive foreign  
policy and mainly Turkey’s turn to other than the European regions for political  
85  
  
cultural and economic cooperation. Also, Neo-ottomanism underlines Turkey’s  
central role for the region and the global affairs , as a successor of the Ottoman  
grandeur. It is a compromise between Kemalism and political Islam, thus combining  
democratic characteristics  with Islamic values. Turgut Özal, the initiator of Neo- 
ottomanism , had to face post-Cold war challenges, in order to reconstruct Turkey’s  
economy and political status,  while Davutoğlu , who is at the control of one of the  
most important economies of the world, wishes to redeem at political and diplomatic  
level such success. However, the success of this policy lies on the success of Turkey’s  
diplomatic initiatives.  
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